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Abstract
A crowded trade emerges when speculators’ positions are large relative to the asset’s
liquidity, making exit difficult. We study this problem of recent regulatory concern by
focusing on short-selling. We show that days to cover (DTC), the ratio of short in-
terest to trading volume, measures the costliness of exiting crowded trades. Crowding
is an important concern as short-sellers avoid illiquid stocks, which we establish using
an instrumental-variables strategy involving staggered stock market decimalization re-
forms. Arbitrageurs require a premium to enter into such trades as a strategy shorting
high DTC stocks and buying low DTC stocks generates a 1.2% monthly return. A
smaller days-to-cover effect also exists on the long positions of levered hedge funds.
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1 Introduction
One of the most dramatic changes in financial markets in the last twenty years has been the
rise of sophisticated investors. Hedge funds, perhaps the leading example of such investors,
attracted negligible assets under management before the late nineties. The hedge fund sector
now stands at 3.13 trillion dollars in 2015, which is roughly 10% of the size of the worldwide
mutual fund sector (Mutual Fund Fact Book (2015)). These sophisticated investors, or
arbitrageurs as we will loosely also refer to them, are practiced in both the use of short-
selling and leverage, thereby magnifying their impact on financial markets.
A number of papers have pointed to this trend and its consequences for market efficiency
(French (2008); Stein (2009)). One potentially important result of having so many sophis-
ticated investors is the crowded trade problem. If too many arbitrageurs are on the same
side of the trade, their coordinated exit from speculative and potentially levered strategies,
which are typically absent from retail investors’ portfolios, might be destabilizing for finan-
cial markets. This problem is a likely motivation behind increased disclosure requirements,
as part of the Dodd Frank Financial Reforms following the Financial Crisis of 2008, to ad-
dress systemic risk. Sophisticated investors are now required to disclose how much assets
they have in certain strategies and at a much higher frequency.
The literature up to this point has focused on how crowded trades emerge naturally in
price-untethered quantitative strategies such as price momentum (Stein (2009); Lou and
Polk (2013)). If investors are buying on price trends, it is likely that these investors end up
with some probability in over-priced positions. But this problem is likely to emerge more
generically whenever the aggregate position of arbitrageurs is large relative to the liquidity
of the asset or trade, which would then make exit difficult. Indeed, such crowdedness across
a number of trades is increasingly cited as a problem by the expanding hedge fund sector
(see, e.g., ”Crowded Trades Collapse,” Wall Street Journal, December 3, 2015).
In this paper, we examine the link between crowded trades and liquidity in the context
of short-selling. Short-selling is a good setting to study this question for a few reasons.
First, shorting is by and large executed by sophisticated investors. Second, the ratio of
shares shorted to shares outstanding (SR) has also been shown to predict negative returns
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consistent with informed arbitrageurs trading against mispricing.1 Third, these trades are
medium term in nature and implicitly levered in that the loan of the shares might be recalled
at any moment, thereby triggering forced short-covering (i.e. the buying back of shares to
pay back the loans) and hence potentially large upward price movements or positive skewness
if there is not enough liquidity.
We show that days-to-cover (DTC), which divides short ratio by average daily share
turnover—is a natural statistic for measuring the crowdedness of short trades. Consider as
an example two stocks X and Y. Stock X with a short ratio of 5% and average daily turnover
of 1% has a DTC of 5 days. Stock Y with a short ratio of 5% and average daily turnover of
5% has a DTC of 1 day. DTC is widely monitored by short-sellers and thought of as a risk
management tool similar in spirit to the crowded trade interpretation we propose. Indeed,
some practitioner sites (such as Investopedia) equate DTC with crowded trades. Short-sellers
report that they prefer stocks where they are able to close or cover their positions quickly
without having to account for a big part of the daily market volume (i.e. stock Y compared
to X). DTC is a measure of the ease with which they can achieve this goal.2 Yet, as far as
we know, it has not been previously studied.
We develop a simple model with competitive arbitrageurs who face an over-priced stock
but incur trading costs in establishing their short positions. The trading cost is increasing, all
else equal, in the aggregate position of arbitrageurs. This is a reduced-form way of capturing
the one-sidedness or crowdedness of arbitrage trades relative to liquidity in the market. We
then solve for a symmetric equilibrium among arbitrageurs and prove that DTC captures
the costliness of entering crowded positions.
Our model generates two key predictions to the extent that such costs are a concern.
First, the short interest ratio of a stock should decline in the illiquidity of the stock. The
reason is that stocks with higher price impact costs are more at risk for a crowded trade
1See, e.g., Figlewski (1981), Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001), and Asquith, Pathak, and
Ritter (2005). A more recent strand of the literature looks at the higher frequency trading strategies of
shorts to support the view that short-sellers are indeed sophisticated arbitrageurs (Boehmer, Jones, and
Zhang (2008), Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009b) and Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012)).
2We can equivalently, as practitioners do, calculate DTC using shares shorted to average shares traded
daily; but for our empirical analysis below, it is more convenient to scale everything first by shares outstand-
ing. The two ways of calculating are identical (absent significant changes in shares outstanding within a
given month) and yield identical results.
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problem. So arbitrageurs will in equilibrium short less of these stocks, all else equal. Second,
to the extent DTC is a serious concern for arbitrageurs, we should see high DTC stocks
under-performing significantly to compensate the arbitrageurs for entering these positions in
the first place. Our insights also apply to long positions of hedge funds, which are typically
levered; we will examine this levered long-side at end of the paper.
Our sample period runs from 1988 to 2012. Our baseline DTC measure divides the short
interest ratio measured in a given month by the average daily turnover during the same
month.3 In our sample, the mean DTC for a cross-section of stocks is 5.5 with a standard
deviation of 8.26 days. In the time series, DTC has risen from a low of 3 days to 7 days
during the recent sample, consistent with the worries of practitioners about crowded trades
being an increasing problem.
We then test our first prediction, which is that short ratio (SR) of a stock should be
correlated with its trading cost or liquidity. We consider a variety of liquidity measures
and find that the turnover proxy has the most explanatory power for SR. To address the
causality of the relationship between SR and turnover, we instrument for turnover using
the decimilization reforms of the early 2000s on the US stock exchanges. Our exclusion
restriction is that decimalization did not affect arbitrageur short-selling other than through
decimilization improving the liquidity of the market.4 We argue below that this premise is
a plausible one based on our reading of the existing empirical literature on the effects of
decimilization (Bessembinder (2003), Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009a)).
Our theory is agnostic on which liquidity measure is the best. But the fact that turnover is
much stronger compared to bid-ask spread is consistent with worries of forced short covering.
Such trades are bound to be large and turnover is likely a better measure of the true trading
costs compared to bid-ask spread or other price impact measures which implicitly assume
that investors can trade slowly.
Consistent with our second prediction, we find that arbitrageurs are compensated for
3Our results are similar when we scale by average daily turnover calculated using data from prior months
instead since liquidity tends to be persistent.
4As we elaborate below, the reduced form IV is to show that the staggered decimilization of NYSE-AMEX
stocks first and then NASDAQ stocks later led to an increase in SR for NYSE-AMEX stocks compared to
NASDAQ stocks during the staggered reform period. The 2SLS involving turnover makes the additional
assumption that short-sellers focus on turnover as their preferred proxy for liquidity.
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entering high DTC positions. We can also consider an alternative form of DTC whereby we
regress SR on all liquidity measures (including turnover) to create a Residual SR measure.
Though Residual SR is also significant in predicting returns, consistent with a crowded trade
effect, it turns out that DTC generates a much larger spread than Residual SR, especially
for value-weighted portfolios. So we will focus on DTC in our discussions, though one could
use the analogous Residual SR variable.
A strategy long low DTC decile stocks and short high DTC decile stocks yields 1.19% per
month with a t-statistic of 6.67. A value-weighted DTC strategy also yields a statistically
significant .67% per month. Since big stocks are more liquid, the DTC premium is smaller
when considering larger stocks. We also show that DTC is statistically significant across
a variety of return benchmarks, such as Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)
adjusted returns and the Carhart (1997) four-factor and Carhart (1997) plus Pa´stor and
Stambaugh (2003) five-factor alphas. In other words, DTC’s predictive power is not simply
picking up a liquidity effect, which one might worry is the case since DTC scales SR by daily
turnover.
In multiple regressions, we then show that the DTC effect in terms of predicting excess
returns is distinct from an SR effect. SR does not account for crowded trade issues, which
are likely to vary across stocks depending on the liquidity of the stock. Second, we show
that our DTC variable is not mechanically related to other turnover-based measures such
as illiquidity (Amihud (2002)), which divides the absolute value of returns by dollar trading
volume. These two variables, though both have turnover in the denominator, are not strongly
correlated. The same is true if we use the inverse of turnover. The reason, as we showed
above, is that SR is strongly correlated with turnover.
Moreover, one might worry that our DTC effect is somehow a redux of the well-known
result that pricing anomalies such as the market-to-book effect are stronger in low turnover
or less liquid stock since the limits of arbitrage are stronger in these stocks. To the extent
SR is associated with high market-to-book stocks, perhaps DTC is inadvertently capturing
this old phenomenon. We show that this is both theoretically and empirically not the case.
Our model also generates the usual prediction that stocks with higher lending fees are
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more overpriced.5 But the lending fee effect is distinct from our DTC effect. Over a short
sample since 2003, we also have lending fees by stock, which has also been shown to be a
proxy for over-pricing. We find that the DTC effect remains controlling for lending fees.6
While we have focused on the short side, our analysis also applies theoretically to the
long side. We show that this is the case using hedge fund holdings. Hedge funds are typically
levered with a leverage ratio of 2 to 1, which is comparable to the implicit leverage of short-
selling. The leverage hence makes forced covering of hedge fund long positions also plausible
in contrast to the positions of unlevered mutual funds. We find a crowded trade effect on
the long side of hedge fund trades but the effect is smaller than for short-selling.
This excess return predictability, in our model, reflects two forces. The first is the usual
limits of arbitrage assumption that there is limited capital in arbitrage trades such as short-
selling (see, e.g. Hanson and Sunderam (2014)). The second, and new to our model, is
the explicit use of trading costs motivated by crowded trades. To drive home the point
that our DTC effect is new and distinct from prior analyses, we move beyond our simple
reduced-form model to highlight the costs of DTC versus SR portfolio strategies during the
Short-selling Ban of US financial stocks in 2008. We find that shorting high DTC stocks
indeed experienced significant losses compared to other stocks as short-sellers were forced to
cover their shorts. The cumulative drawdown for the value-weighted DTC strategy is -64%
in the August, September and October of 2008. This was not the case for high SR stocks.
More broadly and moving beyond our model, we find that high DTC predicts positive
skewness in future daily stock returns whereas high SR predicts negative skewness. The pos-
itive skewness can be loosely interpreted as a small probability of short-covering or exit for
high DTC stocks triggering large upward price movements as occurred during the Financial
Crisis of 2008. In contrast, high SR seems to be consistent with arbitrageurs being informed
and that high SR stocks might suffer some large adverse news shocks with a small probability.
The reverse is true for long-side DTC. Long-side DTC using hedge fund holdings predicts
5See, e.g., D’avolio (2002), Jones and Lamont (2002), Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007), and Beneish,
Lee, and Nichols (2015).
6Following the literature, we also take short interest divided by institutional ownership, SIO, to be a
measure of lending fees (see, e.g., Nagel (2005) and Drechsler and Drechsler (2014)). Our effects are again
robust to controlling for the SIO proxy of lending fees.
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negative skewness while long hedge fund ownership predicts positive skewness. These con-
trasting patterns in skewness warrant deeper theoretical and empirical investigation.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our model and outlines our predictions.
Section 3 describes the various data we used in the analysis and presents summary statistics.
Section 4 examines our first prediction concerning the relationship between short ratio and
stock liquidity. Section 5 presents the second prediction regarding the DTC results. Section
6 looks at the whether there is also a crowded trade problem on the long side of levered hedge
funds. Section 7 moves beyond our static model to explore some potential implications of
DTC versus SR for future skewness in stock returns. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
There are three dates t = 0, 1, 2. The asset yields a payoff at t = 2. There are two types
of agents. A fraction γ of the agents are arbitrageurs and a fraction 1− γ of the agents are
optimists. Optimists believe that the random payoff has a mean µo. They start with one
unit of the asset per-capita. Arbitrageurs have no endowment but believe that the payoff
has mean µa < µo. All agents are risk-neutral.
Before trading at t = 1, half the optimists learn that they will value each dollar at t = 2
as 1 < δ < 2 dollars. The other half at the same time learn that they will value each dollar
at t = 2 as δ′ = 2 − δ dollars. In equilibrium, the optimists that receive the positive time
preference shock δ, more preference for the future, buy shares, whereas the ones that receive
a negative time preference shock 2−δ, less preference for the future, would like to sell shares.
As such, there are two sources of trading in our model. The first is the differences in
beliefs between the optimists and the arbitrageurs. The other is liquidity needs among the
optimists which we generate using this preference shock.
To solve our model, we start with the portfolio maximization problem of the optimists.
Optimists that receive the positive preference shock δ will choose a net demand n+o at t = 1
that solves:
max
n
{
(1 + n)δµo − np0 − co
2
n2
}
(1)
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where p0 is the price at t = 0 and co is the (perceived) trading cost parameter of optimists.
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Notice that n denotes the net demand and (1+n) is the investor’s endowments of the shares
plus his position. Thus the net demand by optimists that receive the positive time preference
shock is:
n+o =
δµo − p0
co
(2)
Optimists that receive the negative preference shock 2 − δ face a similar maximization
problem and will choose a net demand n−o that solves:
max
n
{
(1 + n)(2− δ)µo − np0 − co
2
n2
}
. (3)
It follows then that the net demand by optimists that receive the negative time preference
shock is:
n−o =
(2− δ)µo − p0
co
(4)
We will assume that there are A risk neutral arbitrageurs, which together represent a
fraction γ of the total number of traders. We will make parameter choices that will imply
that, in equilibrium, arbitrageurs are short while optimists are long. The cost of trading
faced by an individual arbitrageur ` that acquires n`a depends on the total amount traded
by arbitrageurs and is given by
c
2
n`a
∑
j
nja.
The motivation for the presence of this externality is as follows. As in the literature on
trading costs (see, e.g., Vayanos (1998)), we think of the quadratic trading cost function
as a reduced form for price impact, which are important in many markets and vary across
stocks.8 Under a price impact interpretation, the trading costs can be identified with shocks
that force shorts to prematurely close their positions. With probability 1
2
, the short-sellers
receive shocks and have to close their short position and buy back the shares. Since the
7It is not crucial that the optimists who we view as retail investors and creating the mispricing perceive
the trading cost correctly. Indeed, studies on retail investor trading such as Barber and Odean (2000)
indicate that retail investors under-estimate these trading costs.
8A recent paper by Frazzini, Israel, and Moskowitz (2012) estimate the price impact as a function of
trade size using live transaction data and find a convex relation.
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optimists still want to hold onto their shares, this will lead to price impact. Market makers
can then provide liquidity in this situation but will set an ask that depends on the aggregate
amount of shares that arbitrageurs wish to sell. Hence arbitrageurs have to trade away from
the average price by an amount that depends on the aggregate amount of shorts. c can then
be interpreted as inventory considerations in Grossman and Miller (1988).
An individual arbitrageur ` would take the trading of all other arbitrageurs as given and
maximize:
max
n`a
{
n`a(µa + f − p0)−
c
2
n`a
∑
j
nja
}
, (5)
where f is the fee to shorting. We assume that the lending fee is exogenous to start and
that the fee is collected by a broker. In the Appendix, we endogenize the lending fee and
show that the main conclusions remain. If the arbitrageurs short n, then nf is the total
short-fees paid by the arbitrageurs. Recall that they have no initial endowment of shares
to begin with. In an interior symmetric equilibrium, the demand by any arbitrageur must
satisfy:
n`a =
µa + f − p0
c+ c
2
(A− 1) . (6)
Hence the aggregate demand by the arbitrageur sector na satisfies
na =
µa + f − p0
c
A
+ c
2
(A−1)
A
. (7)
In the sequel we fix A and write
ca =
c
A
+
c
2
(A− 1)
A
. (8)
Thus the aggregate demand by the arbitrageur sector satisfies9 :
na =
µa + f − p0
ca
. (9)
We will focus on the equilibrium in which the optimists that receive a negative preference
9We may think as ca as the cost perceived by arbitrageurs. The larger the number of arbitrageurs A, the
smaller is the cost that arbitrageurs perceive, since each arbitrageur ignores the impact of their actions on
the other arbitrageurs.
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shock sell some of their shares and the arbitrageurs short. To this end, we require the
following set of parameter restrictions:
δµo > p0 > max {(2− δ)µo;µa + f} (10)
and
p0 ≤ (2− δ)µo + f. (11)
The first set of three parameter restrictions in Equation (10) essentially says that the opti-
mists with the positive preference shock δ buy but the optimists with the negative preference
shock sell while the arbitrageurs short-sell. The second parameter restriction in Equation
(11) says that the optimists with the negative preference shock do not short-sell.
Adding up the three types we get:
γ
ca
[µa + f − p0] + 1− γ
2co
[(2− δ)µ0 − p0] + 1− γ
2co
[δµ0 − p0] = 0 (12)
or
p0 =
1−γ
co
µo +
γ
ca
(µa + f)
γ
ca
+ 1−γ
co
= µa +
1−γ
co
(µo − µa) + γcaf
γ
ca
+ 1−γ
co
(13)
We can think of the first term µa as the fundamental value associated with the expectation
of the risk-neutral arbitrageurs. The second two terms, both of which are positive, reflect
then the overpricing due to costly short-selling γf and costly trading (1− γ)(µo − µa).
This then leads us to our first proposition that is the basis of our first prediction.
Proposition 1. Short interest is given by
γ|na|= γ p0 − f − µa
ca
=
γ(1−γ)
caco
[µo − µa − f ]
γ
ca
+ 1−γ
co
. (14)
The equilibrium short ratio then satisfies:
SR =
γ
1− γ |na|=
γ
caco
[µo − µa − f ]
γ
ca
+ 1−γ
co
=
γ[µo − µa − f ]
γco + (1− γ)ca . (15)
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Since only the optimists that receive the positive preference shock are buys, volume is given
by
V =
1− γ
2
δµo − p0
co
. (16)
So
V =
1− γ
2co
(δµo − µa − f) γca + (δ − 1)µo
1−γ
co
γ
ca
+ 1−γ
co
. (17)
Furthermore,
∂V
∂ca
< 0 (18)
and
∂SR
∂ca
< 0. (19)
Thus, SR is positively correlated with V .
Proposition 1 points out the problematic nature of the short interest ratio (SR) as a
measure of the crowded trades. High SR might simply reflect low trading costs. Ideally, a
crowded trade measure captures both the number of arbitrageurs in the trade as well as the
liquidity on the other side. If ca and co increase in the same proportions, the capital gains
or compensation that arbitrageurs expect for entering the trade, p0 − µa, does not change,
but SR decreases by that same proportion. If the cost of trading varies across assets, SR is
not a good proxy for the compensation for crowded trades.
We next show that DTC, which divides short-interest by the number of shares traded, is
a more robust measure of crowded trades.
Proposition 2. Days to cover is given by
DTC :=
γ|na|
V
. (20)
DTC is a better measure of crowded trades than SR since the elasticity of DTC with respect
to ca is smaller than the elasticity of SR with respect to ca:
0 ≥ eca(DTC) = eca(SR)− eca(V ) > eca(SR). (21)
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The logic of Proposition 2 then implies that we can sort on DTC in the data and see the
extent to which short-sellers are compensated to enter these positions.
Finally, we explain in Proposition 3 below why our DTC effect is not simply a redux
of a standard result, whereby anomalies are stronger in smaller or less liquid stocks that
are more difficult to arbitrage. To be more concrete, consider the well-known fact that the
market-to-book effect is stronger in low turnover stocks. In our model, we can measure the
market-to-book effect as po − µa or the degree of over-pricing. And ca captures the cost of
arbitrage, which one can associate with turnover. To the extent SR is associated with high
market-to-book stocks, perhaps DTC is simply capturing this old result. We show that this
is theoretically not the case.
We need to a few calculations to understand why. First, consider a Taylor expansion of
p0 − µa around γ = 0 to a first order:
p0 − µa = µo − µa +
[
co(f − µo + µa)
ca
]
γ. (22)
Hence for small γ, variations of po − µa are dominated by variations in µo and not ca. On
the other hand, an expansion of SR gives
SR =
[
µo − µa − f
ca
]
γ. (23)
The lack of a zero-th order γ term indicates that even for small γ, variations of SR depend
on both µo and ca. In other words, a double sort on SR and turnover is not equivalent to a
double sort on market-to-book and turnover. Whereas a sort on price essentially picks up
variation in sentiment µo, a sort on SR depends on both µo and cost ca.
Notice that the following inequalities that are easily derived from our equilibrium. First,
∂(po − µa)
∂µo
=
(1− γ)ca
γco + (1− γ)ca > 0, (24)
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(i.e. the more optimistic the sentiment, the more the over-pricing). Second,
∂(po − µa)
∂ca
=
(1− γ)γco[µo − µa − f ]
(γco + (1− γ)ca)2 > 0, (25)
(i.e. the higher the arbitrage cost, the more the over-pricing). Moreover, sentiment µo has a
larger effect on over-pricing among high arbitrage cost stocks,
∂2(po − µa)
∂µo∂ca
=
(1− γ)γco
(γco + (1− γ)ca)2 > 0. (26)
This latter positive cross-partial derivative is the essence of the statement that anomalies
like market-to-book effect are stronger in harder to arbitrage or low turnover stocks.
However, the SR effect is not necessarily stronger in harder to arbitrage or low turnover
stocks to the extent SR varies also because of ca as it is easy to show that
∂2(po − µa)
∂c2a
< 0. (27)
Proposition 3. The DTC effect is not a redux of a standard anomalies effect, whereby the
SR effect (i.e. similar to the market-to-book effect) is stronger in harder to arbitrage (i.e.
low turnover) stocks.
3 Data, Variables and Summary Statistics
We obtain monthly short interest data from the NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq exchanges from
1988 to 2008. The exception is for Amex from 2005-2008, which are from Compustat. Short
interest data from 2009 to 2012 are obtained from Compustat.10 We use the short interest
data that is reported in a given month, typically the mid-point. We start our sample in
1988 since there is little shorting earlier than this date. To form short interest ratio (SR),
we normalize short interest by total shares outstanding from CRSP.
In addition to data on the level of short interest, we use two variables for stocks’ loan fees
10The NYSE-AMEX data is available on Compustat starting in 1976. The NASDAQ data is only available
starting in 2003. There are two versions: unadjusted and adjusted for stock splits. The exchange data we
are using is unadjusted.
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from the Markit equity lending database. The first variable, Fee1, is the simple average fees
of stock borrowing transactions from hedge funds in a given security, which is the difference
between the risk-free rate and the rebate rate. Fee1 is only available for a stock to the extent
that the stock is being shorted by a hedge fund. The second variable, Fee2, which covers
all stocks, is a score from 1 to 10 created by Markit using their proprietary information
meant to capture the cost of borrowing the stock. Here 1 is the cheapest to short and 10 the
most difficult. The first fee variable is available since November of 2006 while the second fee
variable is available since October of 2003.
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we also utilize hedge fund holdings data from
Thompson Reuter’s Institutional Holdings.11 For each stock in the sample, we compute its
quarterly hedge fund holdings (HFH) as the sum of shares held by all hedge funds reported
at each quarter divided by the total number of shares outstanding. If the stock is not held
by even a single hedge fund in that quarter, its HFH is set to zero.
Data on monthly stock returns and daily trading volume are obtained from CRSP. We
require stocks to be listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ and common stocks (i.e. share
type code equals to 10 or 11). We remove stocks with month end price less than $3. Turnover
is calculated as the daily ratio of the number of total shares traded to the number of total
shares outstanding. The daily turnover ratio is averaged within a month to get a monthly
variable. Since the dealer nature of the NASDAQ market makes the turnover on it difficult
to compare with the turnover observed on NYSE and AMEX, we follow Gao and Ritter
(2010) by adjusting trading volume for NASDAQ stocks.12
We use standard control variables in our empirical analysis part. Following Fama and
French (1992), market beta (Beta) of an individual stock is estimated by running a time-
series regression of monthly stock excess return on market excess return over the prior 60
months if available (but requiring a minimum of 24 months of data). Size (LnME) is defined
as natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of June in each year. Book value
11The detailed method to extract hedge fund holdings data can be found in Griffin and Xu (2009) and
Jiang (2014).
12Specifically, we divide NASDAQ volume by 2.0, 1.8, 1.6, and 1 for the periods prior to February 2001,
between February 2001 and December 2001, between January 2002 and December 2003, and January 2004
and later years, respectively.
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equals the value of common stockholders’ equity, plus deferred taxes and investment tax
credit, minus the book value of preferred stock. Book-to-market (LnBM) ratio equals to the
most recent fiscal year-end report of book value divided by market capitalization at the end
of calendar year t-1. Momentum (Mom) is defined as the cumulative holding-period return
from month t-12 and t-2. We follow the literature by skipping the most recent month return
when constructing Momentum variable. The short term reversal measure (REV) is the prior
month’s return. Institutional ownership (IO) is the sum of shares held by institutions from
13F filings in each quarter divided by total shares outstanding.
Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regres-
sion of daily stock excess return on Fama-French three factor returns within a month (Ang,
Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006)). Following Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), analyst
earnings forecast dispersion (DISP) is the standard deviation of annual earnings-per-share
forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the average outstanding forecast. Firm-level vari-
ables are obtained from Compustat annual files. Analyst forecast data is from I/B/E/S.
Data on institutional holdings is from Thompson Reuters Financial.
In addition to trading volume, we create several commonly used measures of stock liquid-
ity based on market microstructure literature. Our liquidity measures include the Amihud
(2002) illiquidity measure, the FHT measure which is backed out from the frequency of
zero returns (Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2014)), the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liq-
uidity measure and the percentage quoted spread using daily close price (Chung and Zhang
(2014)). The details of the construction of these liquidity measures are in the Appendix B.
In the empirical analysis section, we compute monthly characteristic adjusted return by
subtracting the stock’s raw return by the return of the benchmark group to which the stock
belongs to (see, e.g., Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)). The 5*5*5 benchmark
groups are formed at the end of June of each year based on size, book-to-market ratio, and
past one year return. The monthly benchmark returns and stock assignments are obtained
from Russ Wermer’s website 13.
13http://terpconnect.umd.edu/ wermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm
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3.1 Days-to-Cover: Scale Short Ratio by Share Turnover
Based on the analysis in our hypothesis development section, we construct our days-to-cover
(DTC) measure, which scales short ratio by daily share turnover:
DTC =
Short Interest Ratio
Average Daily Turnover
. (28)
Recall SR is typically measured at the middle of a given month. The average of daily
turnover is taken with respect to the same month’s daily share turnover.14 Below, we consider
averaging turnover over prior months and find similar results. The DTC measure has an
intuitive interpretation as roughly how many days of average share volume it would take
for all short sellers to cover their short positions. Figure 1 plots the market average short
ratio, turnover and DTC measure in time series. There is an increasing trend for both SR
and turnover. Short ratio is negligible in the beginning of our sample period, at around 1%,
and then steadily rises and peaks in 2008 at around 5.5%. It has subsequently fallen back
to around 4% in the most recent years of our sample.
Share turnover also improved dramatically during this period, as indicated by the upward
trend of market mean turnover ratio. To put daily turnover on the same scale, we multiplied
by 1000. In 2008, mean daily turnover is 8 in units of 1000, which translates into 0.8%
per day or roughly 200% per year. In the beginning of the sample, the daily turnover is a
fraction of this, at around .20% per day or 50% per year.
However, SR increases more than turnover ratio, so mean days-to-cover (DTC) also
increased a lot, from around 3 days to about 7 days. The rise of SR due to hedge fund
or arbitrageur activity is well known. One can interpret that the latter part of our sample
might be especially relevant in terms of evaluating our model since this is when there are
significant levels of short-selling or arbitrageur activity.
14We can also calculate DTC using shares shorted to average shares traded daily but for exposition it is
more convenient to scale everything first by shares outstanding.
15
3.2 Summary Statistics
To dig deeper into these numbers, Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the variables
used in our analysis. Panel A reports the time series average of the cross-sectional mean
and standard deviation of the variables for the full sample and by market capitalization
quintiles. We start with SR. It has a mean of 2.26%. Note that there is more shorting in
Size Quintiles 2-4 than in Quintiles 1 and 5, consistent with Hanson and Sunderam (2014).
The mean turnover in our sample is .46% per day. The mean DTC in our sample is 5.45
days with a standard deviation of 8.26. Notice that the standard deviation of DTC is quite
large and this will play a key role in our analysis below. The mean institutional ownership
in our sample is 42%. The remaining summary statistics are well known and do not require
additional discussion.
Panel B of Table 1 reports these statistics for our sub-sample where we also have lending
fee data. More specifically, we use the sub-sample where Fee2 is available which is starting
from October 2003. Fee2 is Markit’s internal rating system for whether a stock is difficult to
borrow for shorting, where 1 is cheapest and 10 is the most difficult. We also report summary
statistics for Fee1 which is the simple average of fees of the stock borrowing transactions
among hedge funds, which is available only in more recent sample starting in November
2006.
Both SR and DTC have higher means, 4.32% and 6.85 respectively, in this sub-sample
since it is more recent. A similar comment holds for institutional ownership, which is 58.71%
in this sample. Fee2 has a mean of 1.39 and a standard deviation of 3.56. This number is
fairly consistent across Size Quintiles. If we look at Fee1, we see that the mean is 48 basis
points (annualized) with a standard deviation of 91 basis points. We treat the fees as given
and use them as control variables.
To take this point a bit further, Panel C of Table 1 reports the pairwise rank correlations
among our variables where they overlap. The correlation between DTC and SR is high
at .83 but far from perfectly correlated, as what would be predicted by our model since
trading costs vary across stocks (i.e. turnover varies) and shorts are influenced by the same
underlying unobservable costs (i.e. SR covaries with turnover as we have already established
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theoretically). Indeed, there is different information captured in these two variables which
we will exploit in our asset pricing exercises below.
The other notable correlation is that DTC is not very correlated with IO, Fee1 and Fee2.
They are .33, .18 and .06, respectively. This points to the fact that the issue we are dealing
with regarding the influence of heterogeneous trading costs on shorting is an independent
issue from the lending market frictions that have been emphasized in the literature.
4 Short Interest and Stock Liquidity
4.1 The Relation between Short Interest and Stock Liquidity
The first prediction of our model is that arbitrageurs’ aggregate short position in a stock
should be positively correlated with that stock’s liquidity. To test this, we run the following
regression to examine the relation between short ratio (SR) and stock liquidity:
SRi,t = a0 + a1LIQi,t + a2LnMEi, t+ a3LnBMi, t+ a4MOMi, t
+a5IOi, t+ a6IV OLi, t+ a7Nasdaqi + i,t
(29)
where LIQ represents one of our five liquidity measures: Turnover, Amihud, FHT, Pastor
and Stambaugh and Daily Percent Quoted Spread. The other variables are defined as before.
Table 2 reports the regression results. In column (1) to (7) we run a panel regression
controlling for month fixed effects. We use month fixed effect because it better isolates
the cross-sectional relation between SR and liquidity, which is predicted to be positive by
our model. We cluster standard errors across both the firm and time dimension following
Petersen (2009). All variables are standardized to have mean of 0 and standard deviation
of 1, so the coefficients on independent variables are directly comparable to each other. In
column (1), we only include turnover as the explanatory variables in the regression. As we
can see, the coefficient on turnover is 0.47 and highly significant. Because our variables
are standardized, we could interpret the coefficient as that one standard deviation shock to
turnover is associated with 0.47 standard deviation movement of short ratio. The economic
and statistical significance of turnover in explaining SR are large and as we will see much
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larger than the other control variables.
In column (2), we add control variables along with turnover. The coefficient on these
control variables are all significant and the sign is consistent with previous studies on the
determinants of SR (Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001); Hirshleifer, Teoh, and
Yu (2011)). Short interest is higher among small stocks, growth stocks, loser stocks, stocks
with high institutional ownership and low idiosyncratic volatility. Short interest is also
higher for Nasdaq-listed stocks. However, the adjusted R-square increases from 22.1% to
only 26.4% in this multiple regression and the magnitude of the coefficient on these control
variables are much smaller than the coefficient on turnover. This indicates that among all
the stock attributes, short sellers care most about the stocks’ liquidity and how easy they
could exit their position, which is consistent with our model.
In columns (3) to (6), we replace turnover with other liquidity measures and find the
results mostly support our prediction that short interest is positively correlated with stocks’
liquidity. In column (3), we find the coefficient on Amihud illiquidity is -.04 (t=-19.89). Since
a higher Amihud illiquidity measures lower liquidity, this indicates that short sellers reduce
their position when the stock is more illiquid. Similarly, we find negative coefficient when
liquidity is measured by the FHT (which is based on frequency of zero return trading days)
and daily closing quoted spread measure, as higher value of these two measures indicate less
liquidity. The only exception is Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure in column
(5), which should be a positive coefficient. As pointed out by Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003),
their meausre of liquidity is quite noisy so that they caution against using it as a measure
of liquidity at individual stock level.
In column (7), we add all these liquidity measures in the regression along with other
control variables. The coefficient on turnover barely changes and is also the most important
determinant of short interest ratio based on the coefficient magnitude. The adjusted R-
square in this regression is 28.0%, which represents less than a 30% increase relative to the
regression with turnover alone in column (1).
In column (8), we run a panel regression with both month and firm-fixed effect. The
firm-fixed effect helps alleviate the concern that some unobservables correlated with both
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turnover and short interest may be present and bias the coefficient. The coefficient on
turnover is 0.319 (t=47.3), similar to what we get in column (7).
4.2 Instrumental Variable Regression Using 2001 Shift to Deci-
malization
The results in Table 2 show that short interest is strongly associated with stock’s liquid-
ity level, especially share turnover. Our model predicts that this correlation would result
from variations in the trading costs of arbitrageurs ca, a proxy for the price-impact that
arbitrageurs expect to face. Nonetheless it is still interesting to establish a casual effect of
liquidity on short interest. In this section, we provide evidence for a causal effect of liquidity
on short interest by exploiting a large exogenous shock to stock liquidity during our sample
period.
Prior to 2001, the minimum tick size for quotes and trades on the three major U.S. ex-
changes was $1/16. Over the period of August 28, 2000 to January 29, 2001, NYSE and
Amex reduced the minimum tick size to pennies and terminated the system of fractional
pricing. NASDAQ decimalized shortly thereafter over the period of March 12, 2001 to April
9, 2001. Prior studies show significant increases in liquidity as a result of decimalization,
especially among actively traded stocks (Bessembinder (2003); Furfine (2003)). Decimal-
ization appears to be a good candidate to generate exogenous variation in liquidity since
it directly affects liquidity and the changes in liquidity surrounding decimalization exhibit
variation in the cross-section of stocks.
Moreover, it is unlikely to directly affect short selling other than through the our liquidity-
turnover mechanism. To see why, consider that one worry in the press is that decimilization
effectively relaxed the uptick rule, which did not allow short-selling unless there was an
uptick in price. By making ticks smaller, it might have made short-selling easier. However,
this is unlikely to be important for the type of medium horizon arbitrage trades we are
examining. If the mispricings are close to a random walk, there is ample opportunity for
short-sellers to place their trades in any event. Consistent with this point, the literature
finds that the relaxation of the uptick rule actually did not affect the monthly short-interest
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that we study (Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009a)).15
There are two ways to implement this IV strategy. The first and closest to our model
where the trading cost parameter c is being shifted by decimilization. Our test uses the fact
that decimalization is first implemented for NYSE/Amex listed stocks and subsequently for
NASDAQ listed stocks. In the reduced-form test, we run the following regression:
SRi,t = a+ bNyseamex+ cPostt + dNyseamex ∗ Postt + eXi, t+ i,t (30)
Here Nyseamex is a dummy equal to one for NYSE/Amex listed stocks and zero for NASDAQ
listed stocks. Post is a dummy equal to 1 for the period of February and March of 2001 and
0 for the period from March 2000 to January 2001. We restrict our sample period to March
2000 to March 2001 in this test. Notice we are taking advantage of the staggered reforms
to compare NYSE/AMEX stocks under-going reforms to NASDAQ stocks that have yet to
undergo reforms.
The coefficient on NYSE/Amex dummy measures the average difference in SR between
NYSE/Amex listed stocks and NASDAQ listed stocks in the pre-decimalization period. The
coefficient on Post dummy measures the change in SR in the post-decimalization period
compared to pre-decimalization period for NASDAQ stocks. The coefficient on d therefore
measures the change in SR on NYSE/Amex listed stocks in the post-decimalization period
relative to the change in SR on NASDAQ-listed stocks in a period when only NYSE/Amex
stocks have gone through the decimalization process. The result is reported in Table 3 under
the Column ”Reduced Form”. Consistent with our theory, lower trading costs or more stock
market liquidity results in a positive coefficient d (.0486 with a t-statistic of 2.23), i.e. a
higher SR as a result of a drop in c due to decimilization.
If we make the additional assumption that short-sellers pay attention to turnover as the
key proxy for liquidity that they consider when placing trades, we can then use decimalization
as an instrument for share turnover and examine how an exogenous change in liquidity affect
short interest in a 2SLS regression. Our test again uses the fact that decimalization is first
15Note that we are only focused on medium horizon short arbitrage trades as opposed to intraday high-
frequency short-selling that are part of market-making strategies (Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009b)).
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implemented for NYSE/Amex listed stocks and subsequently for NASDAQ listed stocks. In
the first stage, we run the following regression:
Turnoveri,t = a+ bNyseamex+ cPostt + dNyseamex ∗ Postt + eXi, t+ i,t (31)
The coefficient on NYSE/Amex dummy measures the average difference in turnover be-
tween NYSE/Amex listed stocks and NASDAQ listed stocks in the pre-decimalization period.
The coefficient on Post dummy measures the change in turnover in the post-decimalization
period compared to pre-decimalization period for NASDAQ stocks. The coefficient on d
therefore measures the change in stock turnover on NYSE/Amex listed stocks in the post-
decimalization period relative to the change in turnover on NASDAQ-listed stocks in a period
when only NYSE/Amex stocks have gone through the decimalization process.
The results from this first-stage regression is reported in Table 3 under the Column ”First
Stage”. The coefficient on Nyseamex dummy is significantly negative, indicating stocks listed
on NYSE/Amex have less share turnover. More importantly, we find the coefficient on the
interaction term is significantly positive with a coefficient of 0.074 (t=4.01), indicating share
turnover increase significantly for NYSE/Amex listed stocks during the post-decimalization
period compared to NASDAQ stocks.
In the second stage, we use the predicted turnover from first stage IV regression to explain
short interest. The result is reported in Table 3 under the Column ”Second Stage”. As we
can see, the coefficient on predicted turnover is 0.652 and highly significant. The standard
deviation of predicted turnover is 0.612, so the economic magnitude is quite similar to column
(2) in Table 2. The result supports our prediction that short selling activities react strongly
to liquidity changes.
4.3 Correlation between Short Ratio and Turnover Over Time
Now that we have established the causal relationship between turnover and SR, we next look
at how this relationship has changed over time. Panel A of Figure 2 depicts the cross-sectional
correlation between SR and turnover over time. That is, for every month, we calculate the
cross-sectional correlation between SR and turnover. We then plot these cross-sectional
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correlations over time. Note that the correlation between SR and turnover is positive and
has increased over time. In the beginning of our sample in 1988, the correlation is around
0.3 to 0.4. But since the 2000s, this correlation is around 0.5 to 0.6. These results are using
contemporaneous values of short ratio and turnover but the same thing holds if we used
lagged values of turnover.
We next show that these correlations are not driven by omitted valuation factors. To
control for other factors that can potentially confound the cross sectional correlations, we
compute the partial correlation between short ratio and share turnover controlling for size,
book-to-market, past 12 months cumulative returns and institutional ownership. Specifically,
every month t we run the regressions
SRit = α
SR
t + β
SR
it Xit + u
SR
it (32)
Turnoverit = α
T
t + β
T
itXit + u
T
it (33)
where Xit is our collection of control variables, and Turnoverit is our trading cost proxy
share turnover. The cross-sectional partial correlation between short ratio and turnover in
time t is given by
ρt = Corr(uˆ
SR
it , uˆ
T
it) (34)
Panel B of Figure 2 plots the partial correlation of SR with turnover. We see that the
observations made in the univariate correlation case earlier remain true after controlling for
other variables. The overall magnitude of the correlation is smaller, dropping in the post-
2000 sample from around .5 to .6 around .4 to .5. The partial correlations are nonetheless
still positive. Moreover, we see a similar pattern overtime with the correlation becoming
stronger in the recent period. These findings are consistent with worries on the part of the
hedge fund sector in the crowded trade problem over time and wanting to avoid illiquid
stocks as a result.
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5 Compensation for Crowded Trades
To the extent that sophisticated investors worry about the crowded trade problem, our
second prediction is that they should get compensated for being in these positions. Hence,
DTC should strongly and negatively predict subsequent stock returns. In this section, we
test this second prediction of our model using both portfolio sorts and multiple regressions.
5.1 Portfolio Sorts
In this section, we show that stocks sorted on DTC generate significant return spreads. We
conduct the decile portfolio sorts as follows. At the end of each month, we sort stocks into
deciles based on DTC. We then compute the average return of each decile portfolio over
the next month, both equal-weighted and value-weighted. This gives us a time series of
monthly returns for each decile. We use these time series to compute the average return of
each decile over the entire sample. As we are most interested in the return spread between
the two extreme portfolios, we only report the return to a long-short portfolio, i.e., a zero
investment portfolio that goes long the stocks in the lowest DTC decile and shorts the stocks
in the highest DTC decile.16 We report the average return (and associated t-statistics)
of this long-short portfolio in the left columns, the characteristics-adjusted return spread,
computed in the way described by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) and
denoted DGTW in the second columns, the Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas in the third
column and 5-factor adjusted alpha (the return adjusted by the Fama and French (1993)
three factors, the momentum factor, and the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity risk
factor) in the right columns.17
The result is reported in Table 4. In Panel A, the equal-weighted return to the long-
short portfolio sorted on DTC is a monthly 1.19% per month, with a t-stat of 6.67. The
Sharpe ratio is 1.33. We have to be careful, however, to view this as capturing all the risks
of crowded trades since these risks, as we show below, might manifest in the higher-order
moments of returns as we discuss below. For DGTW returns, the numbers are very similar.
16The mean DTC for the decile 1 portfolio is 0.126, while the mean DTC is 25 for the decile 10 portfolio.
17Our results are not affected by using industry-adjusted portfolio returns.
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The four-factor and five-factor alphas are 1.3% per month with t-statistics of around 8. In
Panel B, we see that the value-weighted results are weaker but are nonetheless statistically
and economically significant across the board. For excess returns, it is .67% with a t-statistic
of 2.24. For DGTW returns, it is .59% with a t-statistic of 2.56. The figures are around
.70% for the four- and five-factor alphas and both figures are also statistically significant.
So regardless of the metric, high DTC stocks underperform low DTC stocks significantly.
In Table 5, we examine the robustness of our portfolio sorts on a variety of samples.
As a baseline, we report the full sample results. The DGTW-adjusted return on the long-
short DTC strategy is more pronounced when returns are equally-weighted. We next check
whether our results hold not only in the full sample, but also in each of two sub-periods: one
that starts in January 1988 and ends in December 1999, and another that starts in January
2000 and ends in December 2012. We choose 2000 as the breakpoint as hedge fund activity is
more significant after 2000. Notice that DTC strategy generates a monthly return of 0.70%
in the first half of the sample and 1.10% in the second half of the sample. The higher return
to DTC strategy in the most recent sample is consistent with our model that arbitrageurs
become more concerned about the crowdedness of their short positions over time, which
manifested as higher compensation for taking short position on illiquid stocks.18
The third row of Table 5 shows that our results hold for stocks listed on both NYSE-Amex
and NASDAQ stock exchanges. This assures us that our results are robust with respect to
the different ways trading volume is counted for NYSE-Amex and NASDAQ listed stocks.
DTC strategy generates a monthly DGTW-adjusted return of 0.96% in the NYSE-Amex
sample and 0.76% in the Nasdaq sample. The fourth row shows that sorting stocks into
either 5 portfolios or 20 portfolios does not change our results. Using 5 portfolios, high DTC
stocks underperform low DTC stocks by a monthly 0.78% (t=6.04). Using 20 portfolios, the
return spread is 1.26% (t=7.44).
In Figure 3, we take a more detailed look and report by decile portfolios the equal-
weighted DGTW adjusted portfolio returns. One can see that the pattern for DTC is fairly
18In untabulated tables, we show the return predictability of DTC is less pronounced in the 1976 to 1987
sample, a period when hedge fund activity is negligible. This provides further support to our argument that
the strong return predicability of DTC is not mechanical or spurious, but indeed arises from compensation
for crowded trade positions.
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monotonic, consistent with our model. The lowest DTC decile portfolio has a excess return
of nearly .45% and the highest DTC decile portfolio has a excess return of -0.50%. So the
spread across 10 to 1 is almost 1% and monotonic across deciles. Boehmer, Huszar, and
Jordan (2010) document that stocks with low short interest have positive abnormal returns
in the future. The result in our paper is consistent with their findings that low DTC stocks
also have positive DGTW-adjusted excess return. In untabulated results, we show that this is
mainly due to the part of low DTC stocks that also heavily held by hedge funds. Specifically,
we show that low DTC stocks with low hedge fund holdings do not have abnormal positive
returns.19
The fifth row shows the results when we remove micro-cap stocks. First we remove stock
in the bottom 10% of market capitalization using the NYSE cutoff. The return spread
is a monthly 0.84% for DTC strategy in this sample. When we drop the bottom 20%,
the return spread is 0.79%. Both are highly significant, although the magnitude decreases
compared to full sample results. DTC is more valuable when considering all stocks than
when considering just big stocks. The reason is that dropping the smaller stocks reduces
variation in trading costs in our sample, which means adjusting for trading costs becomes
less valuable. Nonetheless, we still see even among fairly large stocks in the universe that
we see high DTC stocks underperform low DTC stocks significantly.
The sixth row of the Table 5 shows that we obtain similar results if we exclude stocks
whose price at the sorting month is less than $5. Again, DTC strategy generates monthly
excess return of 0.59%. Across almost all the specifications in Table 5, high DTC stocks
underperform low DTC stocks significantly. Figure 5 plots the annual equal-weighted returns
to DTC spread portfolio. This figure also highlights the low volatility of returns to DTC
strategy. As we can see, DTC strategy delivers positive annual returns in 23 out of 25 years.
To get a better sense of how the DTC strategy performs from an investor’s perspective,
we compute the cumulative returns to DTC spread portfolio. Figure 4 Panel A shows
that the equal-weighted DTC strategy generate significant cumulative returns in our sample
period. One dollar invested in the long-short portfolio sorted on DTC at the beginning of
19This finding is consistent with a recent paper by Jiao, Massa, and Zhang (2015).
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1988 will grow to 30 dollars at the end of our sample period.20 Panel B of Figure 4 plots
the cumulative returns for the value-weighted portfolio. The DTC strategy also works for
value-weighted returns, although the magnitudes are less dramatic for the reasons outlined
above. Interestingly, there is a significant draw-down in the strategy of DTC during the
short-selling ban of 2008. The noticeable drawdown in the DTC strategy occurs mostly in
the months of short-selling ban in August and September of 2008. The ban means that the
short-sellers had to cover their short positions and high DTC stocks means it is harder to
cover, resulting in greater losses. We view it as comforting that DTC is indeed capturing
accurately the marginal cost of shorts, i.e. stocks that are more difficult to buy back. We
draw out some implications of this episode for the cross-section of stocks in the last section
of our paper on forecasting skewness of daily stock returns using DTC.
5.2 Is DTC a Redux of More Price Anomalies in Less Liquid
Stocks?
One might think that sorting on DTC is equivalent to the stronger abnormal return sorted
on SR among low turnover stock. That is, we know almost every anomaly produce larger
abnormal profits within the group of stocks subject to greater limits-to-arbitrage. For exam-
ple, the value and momentum effect is stronger among stocks with less liquidity (Ali, Hwang,
and Trombley (2003); Sadka (2006)). Table 6 shows that our DTC measure is distinct from
a double sort on SR and turnover (i.e. a test of our Proposition 3).
To produce this table, in every month we sort all the stocks into quintiles based on short
interest ratio (SR). We independently sort stocks into quintiles based on turnover (Turn).
The monthly excess returns of the 25 portfolios are reported in Panel A. If DTC is equivalent
to a double sort, we would expect the return spread to a long-short portfolio based on SR
to be largest among low turnover stocks. However, we see the return spread is actually
lower among low turnover stocks. The equal-weighted return to the high SR minus low SR
portfolio generates monthly excess return of -0.91% in the lowest turnover quintile, while
this number is -1.76% among highest turnover quintile. For the value-weighted portfolios,
20We have to be careful in interpreting these graphs since they are dependent on how the strategies did
initially. The mean monthly differences are more robust to when one starts the sample.
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we observe similar pattern. The SR portfolio generates monthly excess return of -0.35% in
lowest turnover stocks and -1.21% among highest turnover stocks. Panel B of Table 6 reports
the three-factor alphas of the 25 portfolios. Here we see similar patterns. The SR strategy
generates smaller and less significant alphas among low turnover stocks than among high
turnover stocks. The result in this table clearly shows that our DTC effect is not the same
as a double sort on SR and turnover.
5.3 Fama-Macbeth Regressions
We now test our second prediction that arbitrageurs get compensated for entering crowded
trades using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression methodology. One advantage of this
methodology is that it allows us to examine the predictive power of DTC while controlling
for known predictors of cross-sectional stock returns. This is important because, as shown
in Table 1, DTC is correlated with some of these predictors. We conduct the Fama-Macbeth
regressions in the usual way. Each month, starting in February 1988 and ending in December
2012, we run a cross-sectional regression of stock returns on DTC and a set of control variables
known to predict returns, including market beta (Beta), the natural logarithm of the book-
to-market ratio (LnBM), the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (LnME), and
past returns for the prior month (Rev) and for the prior 12-month period excluding month
t-1 (Mom).
Table 7 reports the time-series averages of the coefficients on the independent variables.
Column (1) and (2) shows that both DTC and SR strongly and negatively predict subse-
quent stock returns in the cross-section when entering into the regression alone, even after
controlling for other known predictors of returns. The statistical significance, however, is
much larger for DTC (t=-9.15) than for SR (t=-5.71). To compare the explanatory power
of the DTC and SR, we focus on t statistics. The average coefficient estimates in a Fama
and MacBeth (1973) regression can be interpreted as monthly returns on long-short trading
strategies that trade on that part of the variation in each regressor that is orthogonal to every
other regressor. The t-values associated with the Fama and MacBeth slopes are, therefore,
proportional to the Sharpe ratios of the self-financing strategies. They equal the annualized
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Sharpe ratios times
√
T , where T represents the number of years in the sample.
In column (3), we run a horse race between DTC and SR by including both in the
Fama-Macbeth regression. The coefficient on SR is cut by half and is significant only at 5%
level, while the coefficient on DTC is largely unchanged and remains highly significant. To
get a sense of the magnitude, the coefficient of -0.042 on SR implies that a one-standard
deviation spread in SR generates a differential in expected returns of 0.16%. The coefficient
of -0.0003 on DTC, however, implies that a one-standard deviation spread in DTC generates
a differential in expected returns of 0.25%, which is 50% higher than SR.21
In column (4) and (5), we use residual short ratio (RSR) as the return predictor. A
higher residual short ratio means arbitrageurs’ willingness to short the stocks given its low
liquidity. RSR1 is the residual from the cross-sectional regression of short ratio on turnover.
We see that the return predictability of SR becomes stronger after adjusting for liquidity.
The coefficient on RSR1 is -0.119 with a t-stat of -8.05. The Sharpe ratio implied by the
t-statistic for RSR1 is 60% larger than the Sharpe ratio for the raw SR. RSR2 is the residual
from the cross-sectional regression of short interest ratio on all trading cost proxies, including
turnover, Amihud illiquidity, FHT measure, Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure
and the daily percent quoted spread. The coefficient on RSR2 further improves to -0.130
(t=-8.74).
5.4 The Effect of DTC Controlling for Lending Fees
In Table 8, we consider how our results change when we add in lending fees as a control.
We have three measures of lending fees. The first is Fee1, which again is the average of
the fee observed in hedge fund borrowing transactions. The results are in columns (1)-
(3). In columns (4)-(6), we add Fee2, Markit’s estimate of the lending fee, as a covariate.
In columns (7)-(9), we take short interest scaled by institutional ownership, SIO, to be a
measure of the lending fee. The motivation for SIO is to proxy for the size of the lending
fee by taking the ratio of demand for shorts to a proxy for the supply of shorts in the form
21Note that our long-short DTC portfolios from the previous section make a much more extreme compar-
ison than the one-standard deviation move considered here, thereby yielding more dramatic differences in
portfolio returns (see Figure 3).
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of institutional ownership (Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005), Nagel (2005), Drechsler and
Drechsler (2014)).
In columns (1)-(3), we see that DTC in this sample is marginally significant with a t-
statistic of -1.71. But Fee1 is also not significant. Notice that Fee1 is a very short sample
starting in November 2006. So the lack of statistical significance is not surprising. SR
is insignificant in the Fee1 sample. Moreover, the coefficient on SR is -.03, which is still
economically much smaller than before. In column (3), we find that DTC is a more significant
predictor than SR. Indeed, in this specification, DTC attracts a coefficient of -.0003 and a t-
statistic of -2.48. In other words, DTC is very robust to different sub-periods and controlling
for Fee1.
In columns (4)-(6), we control for Fee2. In this larger sample, we see that DTC attracts
a coefficient of -.0003 with a t-statistic of -2.86 in column (4). The coefficient on Fee2 is
-.0025 with a t-statistic of -3.40. This is consistent with the literature that lending fees are
a significant predictor of poor returns consistent with binding short-sales constraints and
over-pricing. The economic and statistical significance of DTC is comparable to Fee2. In
column (5), we see that the coefficient in SR is still small, at around -.0251 but now has a
t-statistic of -1.56.
In columns (7)-(9), our effects are again robust to controlling for lending fees. In column
(7), the coefficient on DTC is -.0002 with a t-statistic of -4.05. The coefficient on SIO is
-.0142 with a t-statistic of -5.34. So DTC is comparable in economic significance to SIO
in this sample. In column (8), we see that the coefficient on SR is insignificant. A similar
conclusion holds from column (9).
5.5 Robustness
In Table 9, we consider a number of alternative explanations for the power of DTC to
forecast returns. Our primarily concern is that the literature has found that lagged turnover
measured at different horizons forecasts stock returns.
First, the DTC measure used in our previous analysis is short ratio (SR) scaled by the
average of this month’s daily turnover ratio. We show that our results are robust to the
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horizon length over which we average daily turnover. For DTC2, we average daily turnover
in the previous month. For DTC3, we use the past 6-months of data to calculate daily
turnover. For DTC4, we use the past one-year of daily observations to calculate average
daily turnover.
Second, our DTC results could be driven by the high volume return premium as docu-
mented in Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001). They find stocks experiencing abnormal
recent increases in trading volume this week have high average returns in subsequent weeks.
Stocks experiencing abnormal increases in trading volume would have low DTC measure by
construction, and that could contribute to the strong return predictability of DTC.
In column (1) and (2), we run a horse race between DTC and DTC2 with 1/Turnover
and 1/Turnover2, where Turnover and Turnover2 are the average daily turnover measured
at the same horizon as the ones used to construct DTC and DTC2.22 The coefficient on
1/Turnover and 1/Turnover2 indeed comes in with the expected sign. Low turnover stocks
do worst the next month, consistent with Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001). But our
DTC effect and this low turnover effect are different because SR is highly correlated with
turnover and so our DTC variable is not very correlated (just .09) with 1/Turnover.
Alternatively, we worry that our results might be related to Amihud (2002), where share
turnover is in the denominator and is typically measured using longer horizons of data going
back as far as one year. So we control for the Amihud (2002) illiquidity factor in column (3)
and (4) and find that our results are largely unchanged. The coefficient on DTC3 is -.0004
and is statistically significant with a t-statistic of -7.20. The coefficient on the illiquidity
measure is not strong in this sample. A similar conclusion holds for DTC4.
In column (5) and (6), we consider a more simplified version of Amihud (2002) which is
the inverse of turnover, 1/Turnover3 and 1/Turnover4, from Lou and Shu (2014). Again, we
find that DTC3 and DTC4 remains economically and statistically significant. The coefficient
is virtually unchanged. In this specification, the inverse of turnover weakly forecast stock
returns. Yet, the power of DTC3 and DTC4 remain the same.
In column (7), we show that DTC captures the marginal cost associated with trading
as opposed to fundamental risks as captured say idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) of Ang,
22We get the same results if we used Turnover and Turnover2 in the specification instead.
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Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Another reason why we are interested in idiosyncratic
volatility is that Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) find that IVOL captures potential over-
pricing due to short-selling costs. We find again that the coefficient on DTC is unchanged
when adding in IVOL to our regression. To the extent DTC again is capturing over-valuation,
it might be driven by disagreement and binding short-sales constraints effects as measured
by Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002)’s analyst forecast dispersion. In column (8), we
show that DTC is not capturing the same effect as this over-valuation factor.
6 Evidence from Hedge Fund Holdings
Our model predicts that arbitrageurs will require extra compensation to enter into
crowded positions also on the long-side. We simply need to modify the model by replac-
ing the optimistic retail investors with pessimistic retail investors. The arbitrageurs would
then want to take a long position. Assuming similarly that the cost of trading increases in
the aggregate long positions of the arbitrageurs, we would obtain similar predictions on the
long-side. So it is an empirical question the extent to which crowded trades on the long-side
also matter.
6.1 Hedge Fund Holdings and Stock Liquidity
We first examine whether hedge funds’ long-side positions are also correlated with stock
liquidity. To test this, we regress hedge fund holdings (HFH) on various liquidity measures
and a set of control variables including size, book-to-market, past 1-year return, institutional
ownership and idiosyncratic volatility, similar to the short ratio regression. The results from
this regression are reported in Table 10. We run a panel regression with quarter fixed
effects from column (1) to (7). In column (1), we include turnover as the only explanatory
variable. The coefficient on turnover is 0.184 (t=21.19), suggesting that hedge funds’ long-
side positions are also strongly associated with trading volume. However, both the coefficient
and adjusted R-square (3.4%) are much smaller compared to the regression when short ratio
is the dependent variable. This means that while hedge funds are also concerned about
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stock’s liquidity when taking long positions, the concern is much less compared to their
short positions. When we include other control variables in column (2), the coefficient on
turnover is reduced by half to 0.097, but is nonetheless still highly significant. The results
also hold when we use other proxies for stock liquidity, as reported in columns (3) to (6).
Finally, hedge fund holdings are strongly correlated with trading volume when we control
for both quarter- and firm-fixed effects in the panel regression in column (8).
6.2 Return Predictability of Turnover-adjusted Hedge Fund Hold-
ings
Our model predicts that arbitrageurs require additional compensation on stocks with ab-
normally large arbitrage positions. We have shown that days-to-cover, which measures how
crowded the stock is on the short-side, predicts return negatively. When this intuition is
applied to arbitrageur’s long-side positions, we expect stocks with abnormal large hedge
fund holding relative to its level of liquidity should outperform other stocks in the future.
Ideally, we would like to create a measure similar to days-to-cover and examine its return
predictability. However, simply dividing hedge fund holdings in a stock by average daily
turnover in that stock has many problems. First, a large portion of stocks have zero hedge
fund holdings, especially during the early sample period when hedge fund assets are negli-
gible. This will result in a large proportion of stocks with DTC of zero. Secondly, hedge
fund holdings are not as strongly correlated with turnover as we see in short interest ratio,
so putting turnover in the denominator will lead to some stocks with extremely high DTC
measures. Instead, we use the residual hedge fund holdings (RHFH) as the measure of the
our long-side version of DTC. The residual hedge fund holdings is obtained by taking the
residual from a cross-sectional regression of quarterly hedge fund holdings in a stock on the
average turnover of that stock at each quarter.
We first use portfolio sorts to examine the return predictability of residual hedge fund
holdings (RHFH). At the end of each quarter, we sort all the stocks into decile portfolios
based on residual hedge fund holdings (RHFH) and a long-short portfolio is formed by
buying the highest RHFH portfolio and shorting the lowest RHFH portfolio. Portfolios are
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rebalanced at each quarter.
From Table 11, the long-short portfolio based on residual hedge fund holdings generates
significant positive returns for both equal- and value-weighted portfolios. The average equal-
weighted monthly return to this long-short portfolio is 0.65% with a t-stat of 3.52. The
Sharpe ratio is 0.77. A DGTW adjustment leads to a lower return of 0.46% but is still
significantly different from zero. The four-factor and five-factor alphas are around 0.70%
and highly significant. In Panel B, we see the value-weighted results are still significant in
this case. For excess return, it is 0.74% with a t-stat of 3.07. For DGTW adjusted returns,
it is 0.58% with a t-stat of 2.72. The alphas from four-factor and five-factor model are also
significantly positive at around .6%.
We also use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression to examine the return predictabil-
ity of residual hedge fund holdings. This approach allows us to control for the usual firm
characteristics. The result is reported in Table 12. We first examine whether the raw hedge
fund holdings measure could predict next quarter’s stock returns in column (1). The coeffi-
cient on hedge fund holdings (HFH) is 0.013 but not significant (t=1.47). This is consistent
with the existing evidence on the weak return predictability of hedge funds’ holdings23. In
column (2), we use the residual hedge fund holdings to predict returns. In contrast to the
previous result, the coefficient on RHFH is 0.024 and significant at 1% level. The strong
return predictability of residual hedge fund holdings is in sharp contrast to the raw hedge
fund holdings measure and shows hedge funds’ positions are informative when the position
is large relative to stock liquidity. In column (3) and (4), we add days-to-cover (DTC) in
the multiple regression. The coefficient on residual hedge fund holdings is still significantly
positive, and the coefficient on DTC is significantly negative. This result demonstrates that
arbitrageurs are also compensated for entering crowded positions on the long side. In untab-
ulated results, we also adjust the institutional ownership (excluding hedge fund ownership)
for stock turnover, and we do not find the evidence that residual institutional ownership ad-
justed for liquidity predict next quarter’s returns. This is consistent with the vast majority
of institutions not being levered. Overall, we find a long-side DTC effect but it is milder
23Griffin and Xu (2009) document that hedge fund ownership does not predict next quarter stock returns
once they control for momentum.
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than the short-side DTC effect.
7 Short-side and Long-side DTC and Forecasting Daily
Return Skewness in the Cross-Section
To drive home the point that our DTC effect is new and distinct from prior analyses, we move
beyond our simple reduced-form model to highlight the costs of DTC versus SR portfolio.
To the extent that there is a small chance that short-sellers are forced to exit crowded trades
and experience extreme positive daily stock returns as a result, as in the instance of the
Short-selling Ban of US financial stocks in 2008, we expect that high DTC stocks ought to
predict higher positive skewness in daily stock returns. This stands in contrast to SR which
if anything we expect to predict negative skewness in daily stock returns since SR has been
established in the literature to contain negative information about future stock returns. The
reverse should also be true for long-side DTC in contrast to long hedge fund ownership. Our
analysis here stands in contrast to the basic summary statistics for the DTC portfolios in
our earlier section which focused on monthly stock returns in contrast to daily stock returns.
To test this prediction, we run Fama-Macbeth regression of future 3-month daily return
skewness on DTC, SR and a set of control variables, including lagged 3-month return skew-
ness (Lskew3m), past 6-month turnover (Turnover6m), size, B/M, past 12-month return,
idiosyncratic volatility and institutional ownership ratio.24 The result is reported in Table
13. In column (1), we only include the control variables and many of them come with ex-
pected signs. For example, lagged return skewness and idiosyncratic volatility positively
predict and past cumulative returns and turnover negatively predict future skewness. In
column (2), we add SR in the regression. The coefficient on SR is significantly negative with
a t-stat of -2.59. This means highly shorted stocks are more likely to experience crashes in
the future. In column (3), we add DTC along with SR in the regression. The coefficient on
DTC is significantly positive with a t-stat of 3.68. The result supports our hypothesis that
high DTC stocks are more likely to experience positive daily return skewness due to a small
24The regression specification we use to forecast return skewness follows Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001)
and Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010).
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chance of exiting crowded trades.
In column (4) and (5), we look at whether there is a symmetric predictability of return
skewness on the long side. Column (4) shows that hedge fund holding positively predicts fu-
ture skewness, suggesting that hedge funds are informed investors and stocks heavily longed
by hedge funds experience large positive news shocks. In contrast, residual hedge fund hold-
ing negatively predict return skewness, consistent with our argument that forced deleveraging
on the long-side of hedge funds leads to stock price crashes.
Our analysis here is suggestive and preliminary. In unreported tables which are available
from the authors, we study the extent to which DTC also predicts higher lending fees or
higher risk of the loan being recalled as measured by Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg
(2014). We find that DTC does not predict these quantities which suggest that the posi-
tive skewness is likely to stem from forced exit in the presence of illiquidity as opposed to
conditions in the lending market.
8 Conclusion
The recent Dodd Frank Financial Reforms require increased disclosure by institutional in-
vestors. These reforms are in part motivated by worries of a crowded trade problem, whereby
aggregate speculators’ positions are large relative to the liquidity of the asset. The exit from
crowded trades can be destabilizing as there is little liquidity on the other side of the trade.
These reforms are consonant with similar worries on the part of practitioners as the sophis-
ticated investors are becoming an increasingly large part of the market.
We study this problem in the context of short-sellers. We develop a simple model to
analyze days to cover (DTC), a widely used statistic by short-sellers to monitor crowded
trades. We find that arbitrageurs are worried about the crowding problem as they system-
atically avoid illiquid stocks, all else equal, and require a significant premium to enter into
crowded positions. There is a crowded trade problem on the long-side. We also show that
both short-side and long-side DTC can help predict daily stock return skewness, though
more work is needed to model and analyze these last findings.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Appendix A
Endogenizing the lending fee f
Now suppose that in addition to arbitrageurs and optimists there is a third type of traders,
index funds, with portfolio choices that are insensitive to prices or payoff forecasts. We
suppose that on aggregate these new type of agents hold ν shares for each agent of the other
two types. Since we normalize the number of arbitrageurs plus optimists to 1, index funds
hold a total of ν shares, and the total number of shares is ν + 1− γ.
Index funds are the only suppliers of borrowed shares. We assume that the market
clearing fee is given by
f = f0 + f1x, (35)
where x is the amount of shares borrowed, provided x < ν.
For simplicity, we set A = 1 and c = co. As before the demand by each arbitrageurs is
given by
na =
µa + f − p0
c
< 0. (36)
Hence the total demand for shorting by arbitrageurs is:
γ|na|= γ p0 − µa − f
c
or using equation (35), we get
γ|na|= γ(p0 − µa − f0)
γf1 + c
Notice that this coincides with results on the text whenever f1 = 0
Since index funds do not adjust their portfolio, the market clearing price for a given f
stays the same that is:
p0 = (1− γ)µo + γµa + γf = µa + (1− γ)(µo − µa) + γf. (37)
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f is now endogenous and in equilibrium
p0 − µa = γf1 + c
γf1 + c− γ2f1
[
(1− γ)(µo − µa) + γf0 − γ
2f0f1
γf1 + c
]
(38)
However for γ small (i.e. γ2 ∼ 0), p0 − µa is invariant to c. More precisely,
p0 − µa − (1− γ)(µo − µa)− γf0 = γ
2f1
γf1 + c− γ2f1 [(1− γ)(µo − µa) + (γ − 1)f0]
Hence,
p0 − µa = (1− γ)(µo − µa) + γf0 + γ2f1Γ(c, f0, f1, γ),
with Γ bounded.
On the other hand, short interest satisfies:
SR =
γ|na|
1− γ + ν =
γ(p0 − µa − f0)
(γf1 + c)(1− γ + ν) =
(1− γ)γ(µo − µa − f0) + γ3f1Γ(c, f0, f1, γ)
(γf1 + c)(1− γ + ν)
Thus if γ2 is small enough, SR decrease with c.
Furthermore, since f does not enter the optimization problem of the optimists, we still
obtain that turnover V equals
1− γ
2(1− γ + ν) ×
(δµo − po)
c
Thus
DTC =
2c[γ(µo − µa − f0) + γ3fΓ]
(γf1 + c)[(δ − 1)µo + γ(µo − µa − f0)− γ2f1Γ]
Notice that for any fixed c > 0 ∂Γ
∂γ
is bounded above.
Thus taking a first order expansion of DTC around γ = 0 we obtain, as before,
DTC ∼ 2γ(µo − µa − f0)
(δ − 1)µo
37
9.2 Appendix B
Construction of liquidity measures:
1. Amihud = Average( |rt|
V olumet
), where rt is the stock return on day t and V olumet is
the dollar trading volume on day t. The higher the Amihud illiqudity measure, the more
illiquid the stock is.
2. Daily Percent Quoted Spread = Average( ClosingAskt−ClosingBidt
(ClosingAskt+ClosingBidt)/2
). A higher quoted
percent spread means higher trading cost.
3. The Pastor and Stambaugh liquidity measure is the coefficient Γ from the regression:
ret+1 = θ + φrt + Γsign(r
e
t )(V olumet) + ξt, where r
e
t is the stock’s excess return above the
CRSP value-weighted market return on day t, θ is the intercept, φ and Γ are regression
coefficients, and ξt is the error term. The more negative the coefficient Γ, the less liquidity
the stock is.
4. The FHT measure is the trading cost backed out from the frequency of zero return
trading days: FHT = 2σN−1(1+z
2
), where z is the empirical observed frequency of zero
returns, σ is the stock return volatility and N−1() is the inverse function of the cumulative
normal distribution. A higher FHT measures larger trading cost.
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Figure 1: Time Series of Mean SR and DTC.
This figure shows the monthly Cahart (1997) 4-factor alpha for decile portfolios sorted on ETF-based
stock short ratio. The y-axis is monthly alpha (in percentage) and x-axis is the decile portfolio from low to
high. The sample runs from January 2002 to December 2013.
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Figure 2: Correlations between Short ratio (SR) and Turnover, 1988:01 to 2012:12
(a) Correlation of SR and Turnover
(b) Partial Correlation of SR and Turnover
This figure plots the time series of the cross-sectional correlation (Panel A) and partial correlation (Panel
B) between short interest ratio (SR) and share turnover. The univariate correlation coefficient is computed
in the cross section every month and is plotted over time. The partial correlation between short interest
ratio and share turnover is computed after controlling for size, book-to-market, past 12 months cumulative
returns and institutional ownership. The sample runs from January of 1988 to December of 2012.
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Figure 3: Decile Portfolio Performance
This figure shows the average monthly DGTW-adjusted returns for decile portfolios sorted on days-to-
cover (DTC). Returns are equally weighted within each portfolio. The y-axis is monthly returns and x-axis
is the decile portfolio from low DTC to high DTC.
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Figure 4: Cumulative Returns to DTC Spread Portfolio
(a) Cumulative return (Equal weighted)
(b) Cumulative return (Value weighted)
This figure plots the cumulative equal-weighted returns (Panel A) and value-weighted returns (Panel
B) to the bottom-minus-top decile portfolio formed on days-to-cover (DTC). The sample period runs from
January of 1988 to December of 2012.
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Figure 5: Annual Returns to Equal-Weighted DTC Spread Portfolio
This figure shows the annual equal-weighted returns to the bottom-minus-top decile portfolio formed on
days-to-cover (DTC). The figure also shows the annual excess return on a proxy for the market portfolio
(VW portfolio of CRSP common stocks). The sample period runs from 1988 to 2012.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics of the sample, including the mean and standard deviation
for each variable, and the correlations among them. Days-to-cover (DTC) is short interest ratio (SR)
over daily turnover. Short interest ratio (SR) is the shares shorted over the total shares outstanding.
Share turnover (Turnover) is the daily trading volume over total shares outstanding averaged within a
given month. Hedge fund holdings (HFH) is the sum of shares held by all hedge funds at the end of
each quarter divided by the total number of shares outstanding. If a stock is not held by even a single
hedge fund in that quarter, its HFH is set to zero. Institutional ownership (IO) is the sum of shares
held by institutions from 13F filings in each quarter divided by the total shares outstanding. Market
beta (Beta) is calculated from past five years’ monthly return, following Fama and French (1992). Size
(LnME) is the natural log of firm’s market capitalization at the end of June of each year. Book-to-market
(LnBM) is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted.
Momentum (MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. The short term reversal
measure (REV) is the lagged monthly return. IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility, calculated following
Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Dispersion (DISP) is the analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion
measure, following Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002). Panel A reports the summary statistics for
the full sample and by NYSE size quintile. Panel B reports these statistics for our sub-sample where
we also have the lending fee data. Panel C reports the pairwise correlations (spearman) among our
variables where they overlap. Fee1 is the simple average fees of stock borrowing transactions from
hedge funds in a given security, which is the difference between the risk-free rate and the rebate rate.
Fee2 is a score from 1 to 10 created by Markit using their proprietary information meant to capture
the cost of borrowing the stock. Here 1 is the cheapest to short and 10 the most difficult. Fee1 is
available since November of 2006 and fee2 is available since October of 2003. The overall sample period
runs from January of 1988 to December 2012 except for hedge fund holdings where the data starts from 1992.
Panel A: Summary Statistics-Full Sample
Variables All Firms Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Days to Cover (DTC) Mean 5.45 5.08 7.16 6.27 5.32 3.94
Std. 8.26 9.03 9.06 7.24 5.99 3.92
Short Ratio (SR) Mean 2.26% 1.59% 3.51% 3.48% 2.92% 1.87%
Std. 3.65% 3.32% 4.59% 4.16% 3.23% 1.97%
Turnover Mean 0.46% 0.32% 0.55% 0.66% 0.71% 0.60%
Std. 0.61% 0.51% 0.63% 0.71% 0.72% 0.59%
Hedge Fund Holdings (HFH) Mean 3.32% 3.39% 3.50% 3.62% 3.54% 2.06%
Std. 4.72% 5.41% 4.52% 4.25% 3.89% 2.37%
Institutional Ownership (IO) Mean 42.04% 27.36% 52.85% 59.52% 63.43% 63.02%
Std. 28.99% 24.85% 26.29% 24.56% 21.94% 17.70%
Market Beta (Beta) Mean 1.30 1.40 1.32 1.22 1.14 1.00
Std. 1.06 1.21 0.96 0.85 0.74 0.66
Size (LnME) Mean 5.51 3.96 5.97 6.88 7.80 9.39
Std. 2.14 1.25 0.62 0.56 0.55 1.00
Book-to-market (LnBM) Mean -0.61 -0.44 -0.70 -0.78 -0.85 -1.01
Std. 0.89 0.94 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.80
Reversal (REV) Mean 1.21% 1.22% 1.22% 1.25% 1.22% 1.07%
Std. 17.47% 20.80% 14.41% 12.99% 11.54% 9.86%
Momentum (MOM) Mean 13.92% 11.21% 17.56% 18.12% 16.84% 15.04%
Std. 73.22% 84.79% 63.57% 62.10% 53.18% 41.35%
Amihud Illiquidity (Amihud) Mean 1.11 2.51 0.16 0.02 0.01 0.00
Std. 7.18 10.54 0.47 0.09 0.04 0.00
FHT Mean 0.60% 1.00% 0.52% 0.33% 0.22% 0.14%
Std. 0.70% 0.86% 0.49% 0.35% 0.25% 0.17%
Pastor-Stambaugh (PS) Mean 2.69E-06 6.56E-06 3.04E-07 -1.65E-07 -8.96E-08 -1.25E-08
Std. 0.02% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Daily percent quoted spread (QS) Mean 1.92% 2.81% 1.41% 0.99% 0.77% 0.56%
Std. 1.68% 1.91% 0.80% 0.59% 0.46% 0.30%
Idiosyncratic Volatility (IVOL) Mean 2.59% 3.25% 2.50% 2.14% 1.86% 1.59%
Std. 1.56% 1.72% 1.34% 1.19% 1.01% 0.79%
Analyst Forecast Dispersion (DISP) Mean 0.18 0.31 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.08
Std. 1.01 1.31 0.83 0.63 0.63 0.33
# of Obs. 906377 483318 142346 102408 90635 87670
Table 1 Continued
Panel B: Summary Statistics - Sample with Lending Fee data
Variables All Firms Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Days to Cover (DTC) Mean 6.85 7.59 9.03 6.63 4.46 2.98
Std. 7.37 8.75 6.61 5.20 3.73 2.28
Short Ratio (SR) Mean 4.32% 3.47% 7.06% 6.10% 4.36% 2.46%
Std. 4.71% 4.60% 5.27% 4.87% 3.72% 2.17%
Turnover Mean 0.80% 0.54% 0.99% 1.15% 1.19% 0.96%
Std. 0.82% 0.70% 0.83% 0.92% 0.90% 0.72%
Hedge Fund Holding (HFH) Mean 5.41% 5.66% 5.59% 5.84% 5.91% 3.36%
Std. 6.51% 7.31% 6.19% 6.10% 5.95% 3.60%
Institutional Ownership (IO) Mean 58.71% 43.90% 72.73% 75.57% 76.65% 71.83%
Std. 28.34% 27.51% 22.83% 20.92% 17.64% 14.37%
Market Beta (Beta) Mean 1.31 1.44 1.31 1.24 1.16 0.97
Std. 0.99 1.10 0.96 0.87 0.79 0.67
Size (LnME) Mean 6.38 4.85 6.67 7.50 8.33 9.93
Std. 1.95 1.01 0.34 0.30 0.35 0.86
Book-to-market (LnBM) Mean -0.64 -0.48 -0.69 -0.75 -0.85 -0.99
Std. 0.83 0.87 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.75
Reversal (REV) Mean 1.10% 1.09% 1.27% 1.20% 1.06% 0.82%
Std. 14.04% 16.42% 12.64% 11.25% 10.32% 8.96%
Momentum (MOM) Mean 12.75% 10.39% 15.66% 16.31% 16.36% 12.19%
Std. 66.89% 82.48% 52.39% 47.27% 43.00% 32.66%
Amihud Illiquidity (Amihud) Mean 0.97 2.15 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Std. 11.80 17.50 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
FHT Mean 0.09% 0.15% 0.06% 0.04% 0.03% 0.02%
Std. 0.21% 0.27% 0.14% 0.11% 0.08% 0.06%
Pastor-Stambaugh (PS) Mean -9.00E-07 -1.71E-06 -8.94E-08 -7.39E-08 -4.10E-08 -5.03E-09
Std. 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Daily percent quoted spread (QS) Mean 0.45% 0.86% 0.16% 0.11% 0.09% 0.06%
Std. 0.84% 1.11% 0.11% 0.09% 0.06% 0.04%
Idiosyncratic Volatility (IVOL) Mean 2.15% 2.67% 2.03% 1.77% 1.61% 1.38%
Std. 1.28% 1.42% 1.09% 1.00% 0.85% 0.70%
Analyst Forecast Dispersion (DISP) Mean 0.16 0.27 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.06
Std. 0.84 1.07 0.74 0.51 0.54 0.28
Fee1 (basis point) Mean 48.10 73.04 48.20 39.96 33.11 28.74
Std. 91.44 128.92 89.10 75.83 53.89 34.29
Fee2 (score) Mean 1.39 1.63 1.20 1.12 1.07 1.13
Std. 3.56 1.42 0.85 0.64 0.43 0.17
# of Obs. 279891 142429 43499 32639 30392 30932
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Table 1 Continued
Panel C: Spearman Correlation
SR DTC Turnover HFH IO Beta LnME LnBM Rev Mom Amihud FHT PS QS IVOL DISP Fee1 Fee2
SR 1.00
DTC 0.83 1.00
Turnover 0.69 0.21 1.00
HFH 0.46 0.23 0.50 1.00
IO 0.56 0.33 0.58 0.56 1.00
Beta 0.16 0.03 0.25 0.13 0.05 1.00
LnME 0.54 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.70 -0.08 1.00
LnBM -0.30 -0.20 -0.28 -0.10 -0.17 -0.12 -0.31 1.00
Rev 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.03 1.00
Mom -0.01 -0.06 0.08 0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.08 0.06 0.01 1.00
Amihud -0.61 -0.34 -0.66 -0.44 -0.71 0.06 -0.91 0.26 -0.05 -0.17 1.00
FHT -0.49 -0.33 -0.43 -0.41 -0.54 0.10 -0.60 0.13 -0.02 -0.15 0.63 1.00
PS -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 1.00
QS -0.64 -0.40 -0.60 -0.52 -0.66 0.04 -0.73 0.19 -0.05 -0.17 0.82 0.75 0.03 1.00
IVOL -0.13 -0.19 0.02 -0.14 -0.34 0.29 -0.51 -0.02 -0.02 -0.21 0.52 0.41 0.01 0.53 1.00
DISP 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.08 -0.16 0.23 -0.28 0.20 -0.03 -0.20 0.24 0.21 -0.01 0.18 0.28 1.00
Fee1 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.04 -0.19 0.10 -0.26 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 0.25 0.11 -0.02 0.28 0.23 0.16 1.00
Fee2 -0.01 0.06 -0.11 -0.11 -0.37 0.06 -0.32 -0.05 -0.06 -0.15 0.30 0.18 -0.04 0.37 0.28 0.15 0.43 1.00
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Table 2: Regression of Short Interest Ratio (SR) on Trading Cost Measures
This table reports results from the regression of monthly short interest ratio (SR) on various trading costs
measures. Turnover is the monthly average of the daily turnover ratio. Amihud is the Amihud (2002)
illiquidity measure. FHT is the transaction costs estimated from the frequency of zero returns (Fong,
Holden, and Trzcinka (2014)). PS is the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure. QS is the
percentage quoted spread using daily close price (Chung and Zhang (2014)). Size (LnME) is the natural log
of firm’s market capitalization at the end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is the natural
log of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum (MOM) is
defined as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. IO is the institutional ownership ratio. IVOL
is the idiosyncratic volatility following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Nasdaq is a dummy equal
to one for stocks listed on Nasdaq exchange. We run panel regression with month fixed effect in column
(1) to (7). In column (8), we run panel regression with both month and firm fixed effect. All variables are
standardized to have mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Standard errors are clustered across both firm
and time dimension following Petersen (2009). ***, **, and * stands for significance level of 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Turnover 0.4709*** 0.4375*** 0.4202*** 0.3192***
(69.53) (58.36) (54.31) (47.31)
Amihud -0.0403*** 0.0202*** 0.0129***
(-19.89) (15.78) (13.13)
FHT -0.0952*** -0.0305*** -0.0179***
(-18.76) (-9.39) (-10.19)
PS -0.0035*** 0.0008 0.0003
(-5.69) (1.28) (0.71)
QS -0.2387*** -0.0803*** -0.0084*
(-29.50) (-10.81) (-1.73)
LnME -0.0376*** 0.0467*** 0.0322*** 0.0490*** -0.0301*** -0.0625*** 0.0438**
(-3.65) (4.33) (2.99) (4.53) (-2.65) (-5.17) (2.23)
LnBM -0.1048*** -0.1513*** -0.1518*** -0.1535*** -0.1445*** -0.1068*** -0.0615***
(-16.17) (-20.99) (-21.20) (-21.27) (-18.95) (-15.29) (-9.14)
Mom -0.0658*** 0.0167*** 0.0090** 0.0181*** -0.0089* -0.0743*** -0.0607***
(-16.41) (3.82) (2.04) (4.15) (-1.94) (-16.62) (-15.45)
IO 0.1577*** 0.3099*** 0.3021*** 0.3109*** 0.2803*** 0.1589*** 0.3178***
(15.41) (26.48) (25.92) (26.43) (25.60) (16.02) (23.88)
IVOL -0.0763*** 0.1126*** 0.1435*** 0.1042*** 0.1940*** -0.0318*** -0.0500***
(-17.61) (24.85) (29.56) (23.57) (34.82) (-5.94) (-13.35)
Nasdaq 0.0306** 0.0773*** 0.0612*** 0.0795*** 0.0128 0.0111 -0.2113***
(2.13) (4.75) (3.76) (4.89) (0.76) (0.76) (-7.19)
Fixed effect Month Month Month Month Month Month Month Month and Firm
Adj.R-sq 0.221 0.264 0.129 0.133 0.127 0.165 0.280 0.561
N.of Obs. 1249818 1046916 1046916 1045834 1046916 968053 968039 967896
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Table 3: Instrumental Variable Regression Using 2001 Shift to Decimalization
This table reports the instrumental variable regression using 2001 Decimalization as an exogenous shock
to liquidity. The column labelled ”Reduced Form” reports the regression using short ratio as dependent
variable. The column labelled ”First Stage” reports the first-stage regression result and the column labelled
”Second Stage” reports the second-stage regression result. Nyseamex is a dummy equal to 1 for stocks
listed in Nyse/Amex exchanges and 0 for Nasdaq-listed stocks. Post is a dummy equal to 1 for the period
of February and March of 2001 and 0 for the period from March 2000 to January 2001. Size (LnME) is the
natural log of firm’s market capitalization at the end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is
the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum
(MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. IO is the institutional ownership ratio.
IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Nasdaq is a dummy
equal to one for stocks listed on Nasdaq exchange. All control variables are standardized to have mean of 0
and standard deviation of 1. Standard errors are clustered across both time and firm dimension following
Petersen (2009). ***, **, and * stands for significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The sample
period runs from March 2000 to March 2001.
Reduced Form First Stage Second Stage
Nyseamex -0.0932*** -0.0822*** Turnover 0.6520***
(-9.69) (-10.04) (7.05)
Post -0.0005 0.0011 LnME -0.0452
(-0.04) (0.10) (-1.44)
Nyseamex*Post 0.0486** 0.0744*** LnBM -0.0898***
(2.23) (4.01) (-5.44)
LnME 0.1289*** 0.2670*** Mom -0.1689***
(21.92) (53.28) (-5.31)
LnBM -0.1649*** -0.1152*** IO 0.0384
(-36.72) (-30.13) (1.49)
Mom -0.0231*** 0.2237*** IVOL -0.1654***
(-6.02) (68.61) (-4.00)
IO 0.2187*** 0.2765*** Nasdaq 0.0393
(43.64) (64.77) (1.33)
IVOL 0.1069*** 0.4177*** Ave.R-sq 0.140
(23.84) (109.37) N.of Obs. 60272
Constant 0.0138** 0.0261***
(2.58) (5.75)
Ave.R-sq 0.140 0.384
N.of Obs. 60272 60272
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Table 4: Returns to Portfolio Strategies Based on Days-to-Cover (DTC)
This table provides portfolio returns and alphas, sorted on Days-to-Cover (DTC). At the end of each month,
all the stocks are sorted into deciles based on days-to-cover and a long-short portfolio is formed by buying
the lowest decile and shorting the highest decile portfolio. Portfolio returns are computed over the next
month. We report the excess return, characteristics-adjusted abnormal return calculated following Daniel,
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), denoted as DGTW, four-factor alpha (following Carhart (1997))
and five-factor alpha (Carhart 4-factor augmented by the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor).
Sharpe ratios are annualized. The sample runs from January 1988 to December 2012. Panel A reports the
results for the equal-weighted returns and panel B reports the value-weighted returns.
Panel A: Equal-weighted Portfolio Returns
Excess Return DGTW Adjusted Return Four-factor Alpha Five-factor Alpha
Mean 1.19% 0.95% 1.35% 1.31%
t-stat (6.67) (5.93) (8.32) (8.04)
Std.Dev. 3.09% 2.77%
Sharpe Ratio 1.33 1.19
Skewness -0.38 -0.25
Kurtosis 2.09 5.11
No. of obs 300 300
Panel B: Value-weighted Portfolio Returns
Excess Return DGTW Adjusted Return Four-factor Alpha Five-factor Alpha
Mean 0.67% 0.59% 0.72% 0.79%
t-stat (2.24) (2.56) (2.39) (2.60)
Std.Dev. 5.16% 3.97%
Sharpe Ratio 0.45 0.51
Skewness 0.39 0.49
Kurtosis 2.58 2.82
No. of obs 300 300
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Table 5: Robustness of Portfolio Sorts on DTC
This table reports portfolio sorting results for various robustness checks. The first set of results look at two
sub-periods: one from 1988 to 1999 and one from 2000 to 2012. In the second set of results, we separately
examine stocks listed on NYSE-Amex versus stocks listed on NASDAQ. In the third set of results, we sort
stocks based on DTC into five and twenty portfolios instead of deciles. In the fourth set of results, we drop
all the micro-cap stocks whose market capitalization are in the bottom decile/quintile of all the NYSE
stocks. Lastly, we exclude all the stocks with beginning period of price lower than $5. The sample period
runs from January 1988 to December 2012. Reported are the equal-weighted monthly DGTW-adjusted
abnormal returns of a long-short portfolio that long in stocks of the lowest DTC decile and short in stocks
of the highest DTC decile.
Full Sample Equal-weight 0.95%
t-stat (5.93)
Value-weight 0.59%
t-stat (2.56)
Subperiod 1988/01-1999/12 0.79%
t-stat (4.38)
2000/01-2012/12 1.10%
t-stat (4.25)
Stock Exchanges NYSE-Amex 0.96%
t-stat (6.49)
Nasdaq 0.76%
t-stat (3.00)
Alternative sorts 5 portfolios 0.78%
t-stat (6.04)
20 portfolios 1.26%
t-stat (7.44)
Remove micro-cap stocks Bottom 10% of NYSE size cutoff 0.84%
t-stat (6.14)
Bottom 20% of NYSE size cutoff 0.79%
t-stat (6.71)
Alternative price filter price>=5$ 0.59%
t-stat (3.55)
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Table 6: Returns to Portfolios Double Sorted on Share Turnover (Turn) and Short
Interest Ratio (SR)
This table reports monthly portfolio returns (in percentage) independently sorted on share turnover (Turn)
and short interest ratio (SR). At the end of each month, all the stocks are sorted into quintiles based on
turnover and independently sorted into quintiles based on short interest ratio. We report the monthly
excess returns in panel A and Fama and French (1993) 3-factor alphas in panel B. The sample runs from
January 1988 to December 2012. The left panel reports the results for the equal-weighted returns and the
right panel reports the value-weighted returns. ***, **, and * stands for significance level of 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
Panel A: Mean Excess Return
Equal-weighted return Value-weighted return
Low SR SR2 SR3 SR4 High SR High - Low Low SR SR2 SR3 SR4 High SR High - Low
Low Turn 0.92 0.56 0.33 0.24 0.01 -0.91*** Low Turn 0.75 0.67 0.61 0.69 0.39 -0.35
(-3.36) (-1.36)
Turn2 1.58 1.10 0.75 0.51 0.21 -1.37*** Turn2 1.26 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.60 -0.67***
(-7.54) (-2.70)
Turn3 1.78 1.48 1.08 0.83 0.39 -1.39*** Turn3 1.15 0.94 0.94 1.00 0.71 -0.45*
(-6.62) (-1.95)
Turn4 2.10 1.80 1.33 1.11 0.54 -1.56*** Turn4 1.42 0.87 0.89 0.98 0.72 -0.70**
(-6.23) (-2.29)
High Turn 2.24 1.80 1.49 1.24 0.48 -1.76*** High Turn 2.00 1.68 0.93 1.10 0.79 -1.21***
(-3.70) (-2.74)
High - Low 1.32** 1.24*** 1.16*** 1.00*** 0.47 -0.85* High - Low 1.25** 1.01*** 0.31 0.42 0.40 -0.85*
(-1.81) (-1.78)
Panel B: FF 3-factor Alpha
Equal-weighted return Value-weighted return
Low SR SR2 SR3 SR4 High SR High - Low Low SR SR2 SR3 SR4 High SR High - Low
Low Turn 0.09 -0.39 -0.67 -0.82 -1.18 -1.27*** Low Turn -0.09 -0.19 -0.35 -0.35 -0.75 -0.66***
(-4.96) (-2.66)
Turn2 0.63 0.07 -0.29 -0.55 -0.93 -1.56*** Turn2 0.52 0.10 0.03 -0.03 -0.43 -0.95***
(-8.54) (-3.93)
Turn3 0.87 0.48 0.01 -0.25 -0.75 -1.62*** Turn3 0.33 0.16 0.07 0.08 -0.30 -0.63***
(-8.46) (-2.71)
Turn4 1.11 0.78 0.28 0.00 -0.62 -1.72*** Turn4 0.48 -0.08 0.01 0.01 -0.32 -0.80***
(-7.03) (-2.66)
High Turn 1.21 0.71 0.38 0.12 -0.72 -1.93*** High Turn 0.97 0.59 -0.14 0.10 -0.28 -1.25***
(-4.03) (-2.63)
High - Low 1.11** 1.10*** 1.05*** 0.94*** 0.46* -0.66 High - Low 1.06** 0.78*** 0.21 0.46* 0.47 -0.59
(-1.45) (-1.21)
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Table 7: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Monthly Returns on DTC
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of monthly stock returns
on DTC and residual short ratio (RSR). Days-to-cover (DTC) is the short interest ratio (SR) over daily
turnover. Short interest ratio (SR) is shares shorted over total shares outstanding. Residual short ratio
(RSR) is the residual from the regression of SR on liquidity measures in each month. We use the turnover
to calcualte RSR1 and use all five liquidity proxies to calculate RSR2. Market beta (Beta) is calculated
from past five years’ monthly return, following Fama and French (1992). Size (LnME) is the natural log of
firm’s market capitalization at the end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is the natural log
of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum (MOM) is defined
as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. The short term reversal measure (REV) is the lagged
monthly return. All the t-statistics are Newey and West (1987) adjusted to control for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * stands for significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DTC -0.0004*** -0.0003***
(-9.15) (-5.29)
SR -0.0912*** -0.0417**
(-5.71) (-1.97)
RSR1 -0.1194***
(-8.05)
RSR2 -0.1301***
(-8.74)
Beta 0.0017 0.0020 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018
(1.17) (1.41) (1.29) (1.28) (1.23)
LnME -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004
(-0.50) (-0.24) (-0.45) (-0.42) (-0.74)
LnBM 0.0024*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0024*** 0.0023***
(2.75) (2.69) (2.70) (2.70) (2.68)
Rev -0.0341*** -0.0337*** -0.0340*** -0.0344*** -0.0346***
(-8.17) (-8.14) (-8.18) (-8.30) (-8.38)
Mom 0.0039** 0.0044** 0.0040** 0.0040** 0.0040**
(2.13) (2.39) (2.16) (2.21) (2.16)
Constant 0.0111** 0.0090** 0.0109** 0.0085* 0.0093**
(2.52) (2.04) (2.42) (1.92) (2.11)
Ave.R-sq 0.047 0.049 0.051 0.048 0.047
N.of Obs. 877047 877047 877047 877047 877047
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Table 8: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Monthly Returns on DTC - Controlling
for Stock Lending Fees
This table reports results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of monthly stock returns on DTC,
after controlling short interest ratio (SR) and stock lending fees. Short interest ratio (SR) is the shares
shorted over total shares outstanding. Market beta (Beta) is calculated from past five years’ monthly
return, following Fama and French (1992). Size (LnME) is the natural log of firm’s market capitalization at
the end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio.
The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum (MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns
from month t-12 to t-2. The short term reversal measure (REV) is the lagged monthly return. Institutional
ownership (IO) is the sum of shares held by institutions from 13F filings in each quarter divided by total
shares outstanding. Fee1 is the simple average fees of stock borrowing transactions from hedge funds in a
given security, which is the difference between the risk-free rate and the rebate rate. Fee2 is a score from
1 to 10 created by Markit using their proprietary information meant to capture the cost of borrowing the
stock. Here 1 is the cheapest to short and 10 the most difficult. Fee1 is available since November of 2006
while fee2 is available since October of 2003. SIO is the short interest ratio (SR) divided by institutional
ownership. All the t-statistics are Newey and West (1987) adjusted to control for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. ***, **, and * stands for significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DTC -0.0003* -0.0003** -0.0003*** -0.0003** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(-1.71) (-2.48) (-2.86) (-2.47) (-4.05) (-3.34)
SR -0.0338 -0.0047 -0.0251 -0.0013 -0.0263 0.0048
(-1.01) (-0.14) (-1.56) (-0.08) (-1.12) (0.16)
Beta 0.0022 0.0023 0.0022 0.0024 0.0027 0.0024 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011
(0.77) (0.78) (0.76) (1.02) (1.13) (1.05) (0.80) (0.88) (0.80)
LnME -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0012** -0.0011** -0.0012** -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0011**
(-0.77) (-0.78) (-0.87) (-2.08) (-2.03) (-2.14) (-2.31) (-2.27) (-2.34)
LnBM -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0012 0.0008 0.0006 0.0007 0.0021*** 0.0020*** 0.0021***
(-0.97) (-0.88) (-0.95) (0.77) (0.62) (0.69) (2.82) (2.74) (2.83)
Rev -0.0238* -0.0258* -0.0260* -0.0360*** -0.0358*** -0.0357*** -0.0507*** -0.0508*** -0.0507***
(-1.71) (-1.81) (-1.82) (-4.94) (-4.98) (-4.92) (-12.44) (-12.48) (-12.47)
Mom -0.0047 -0.0046 -0.0047 -0.0029 -0.0027 -0.0028 0.0036** 0.0038** 0.0037**
(-0.71) (-0.71) (-0.72) (-0.70) (-0.65) (-0.69) (2.06) (2.13) (2.05)
Fee1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.37) (0.43) (0.24)
Fee2 -0.0025*** -0.0027*** -0.0025***
(-3.40) (-3.81) (-3.62)
SIO -0.0142*** -0.0186*** -0.0157***
(-5.34) (-7.25) (-5.64)
Ave.R-sq 0.086 0.088 0.090 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.055 0.056 0.058
N.of Obs. 102980 102980 102980 289026 289026 289026 987678 987678 987678
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Table 9: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Monthly Returns on DTC - Robustness
This table reports results from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression for various robustness checks.
Days-to-cover (DTC) is the short interest ratio (SR) over daily turnover. DTC2 is the short interest
ratio (SR) over average daily turnover measured over prior month. DTC3 is the short interest ratio (SR)
over average daily turnover measured over past six months. DTC4 is the short interest ratio (SR) over
average daily turnover measured over past twelve months. Market beta (Beta) is calculated from past
five years’ monthly return, following Fama and French (1992). Size (LnME) is the natural log of firm’s
market capitalization at the end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is the natural log of
the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum (MOM) is defined
as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. The short term reversal (REV) is the lagged monthly
return. Amihud is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. 1/Turnover is one divided by daily turnover
ratio. 1/Turnover2 is one divided by average daily turnover measured over prior month. 1/Turnover3 is one
divided by average daily turnover measured over past six months. 1/Turnover4 is one divided by average
daily turnover measured over past twelve months. IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility, calculated following
Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Dispersion (DISP) is the analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion
measure, following Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002). All the t-statistics are Newey and West (1987)
adjusted to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * stands for significance level of
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DTC -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0006***
(-8.96) (-9.87) (-4.12)
1/Turnover -0.0000***
(-3.17)
DTC2 -0.0003***
(-6.38)
1/Turnover2 -0.0000
(-1.42)
DTC3 -0.0004*** -0.0003***
(-7.20) (-6.90)
1/Turnover3 -0.0000*
(-1.71)
DTC4 -0.0004*** -0.0003***
(-6.28) (-6.00)
1/Turnover4 -0.0000
(-1.03)
Amihud 0.0000 0.0000
(0.23) (0.24)
LnME -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0008* -0.0010*
(-0.87) (-0.59) (-0.56) (-0.54) (-0.55) (-0.41) (-1.93) (-1.80)
LnBM 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0023*** 0.0014
(3.50) (3.45) (3.08) (3.09) (3.40) (3.34) (2.83) (1.44)
Rev -0.0331*** -0.0321*** -0.0315*** -0.0314*** -0.0322*** -0.0321*** -0.0315*** -0.0278***
(-8.61) (-8.32) (-7.97) (-7.94) (-8.33) (-8.31) (-7.67) (-5.74)
Mom 0.0037** 0.0038** 0.0036** 0.0038** 0.0038** 0.0040** 0.0033* 0.0005
(2.07) (2.15) (2.05) (2.15) (2.18) (2.28) (1.91) (0.12)
IVOL -0.1188***
(-3.10)
DISP 0.0017
(0.80)
Constant 0.0131*** 0.0108** 0.0108** 0.0106** 0.0112** 0.0103** 0.0156*** 0.0155***
(2.91) (2.38) (2.48) (2.43) (2.37) (2.14) (4.70) (3.15)
Ave.R-sq 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.050 0.071
N.of Obs. 1041563 1041563 974842 974823 1041563 1041540 1003934 627762
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Table 10: Regression of Hedge Fund Holdings (HFH) on Trading Cost Measures
This table reports the regression of quarterly hedge fund holdings (HFH) on various trading costs measures.
Turnover is the monthly average of daily turnover ratio. Amihud is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure.
FHT is the transaction costs estimated from the frequency of zero returns (Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka
(2014)). PS is the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure. QS is the percentage quoted spread
using daily close price (Chung and Zhang (2014)). Size (LnME) is the natural log of firm’s market
capitalization at the end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is the natural log of the
book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum (MOM) is defined as the
cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. IO is the institutional ownership ratio. IVOL is the idiosyncratic
volatility, calculated following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). We run panel regressions with
quarter fixed effect from column (1) to (7). In column (8), we run panel regression controlling for both
quarter and firm fixed effect. All the variables are standardized to have mean of 0 and standard deviation
of 1. Standard errors are clustered across both firm and time dimension folloiwing Petersen (2009). ***, **,
and * stands for significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Turnover 0.1843*** 0.0972*** 0.0788*** 0.0653***
(21.19) (13.37) (10.42) (9.78)
Amihud -0.0739*** -0.0431*** -0.0128***
(-17.34) (-9.70) (-3.81)
FHT -0.0219*** 0.0333*** 0.0122***
(-3.20) (5.01) (3.31)
PS -0.0092*** -0.0029* 0.0003
(-5.58) (-1.96) (0.29)
QS -0.1041*** -0.0556*** -0.0240***
(-11.62) (-5.83) (-3.28)
LnME -0.2768*** -0.2611*** -0.2585*** -0.2547*** -0.2839*** -0.2872*** -0.3047***
(-28.71) (-25.91) (-25.87) (-25.21) (-27.86) (-29.29) (-15.73)
LnBM -0.0251*** -0.0287*** -0.0367*** -0.0381*** -0.0255*** -0.0175*** -0.0032
(-4.00) (-4.65) (-5.84) (-6.13) (-4.15) (-2.82) (-0.44)
Mom -0.0099** 0.0046 0.0071 0.0102** -0.0035 -0.0119*** -0.0070*
(-2.42) (1.12) (1.62) (2.38) (-0.85) (-2.91) (-1.89)
IO 0.4382*** 0.4694*** 0.4717*** 0.4743*** 0.4579*** 0.4380*** 0.4107***
(38.79) (44.07) (41.73) (42.94) (44.44) (40.10) (31.65)
IVOL 0.0021 0.0744*** 0.0564*** 0.0461*** 0.0869*** 0.0328*** -0.0301***
(0.30) (9.76) (7.48) (5.78) (9.56) (4.09) (-5.19)
Fixed effect Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter and Firm
Adj.R-sq 0.034 0.142 0.139 0.136 0.135 0.140 0.146 0.552
N.of Obs. 385366 323200 323200 323187 323200 318640 318640 318290
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Table 11: Returns to Portfolio Strategies Based on Residual Hedge Fund Holdings
(RHFH)
This table reports portfolio returns and alphas, sorted on the residual hedge fund holdings (RHFH).
Residual hedge fund holdings is the residual of the cross-sectional regression of hedge fund holdings on
turnover at each quarter. At the end of each quarter, all the stocks are sorted into 10 portfolios based on
the residual hedge fund holdings (RHFH) and a long-short portfolio is formed by buying the highest RHFH
decile and shorting the lowest RHFH decile. Portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each quarter. We report
the excess returns, characteristics-adjusted abnormal returns calculated following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers (1997), denoted as DGTW, Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha and five-factor alpha (Carhart
4-factor augmented by Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor). Sharpe ratios are annualized. The
sample runs from January 1992 to December 2012. Panel A reports the results for the equal-weighted
returns and panel B reports the value-weighted returns.
Panel A: Equal-weighted Portfolio Returns
Excess Return DGTW Adjusted Return Four-factor Alpha Five-factor Alpha
Mean 0.65% 0.46% 0.70% 0.64%
t-stat 3.52 2.95 4.49 4.09
Std.Dev. 2.94% 2.48%
Sharpe Ratio 0.77 0.64
Skewness -0.29 -0.21
Kurtosis 1.78 2.20
No. of obs 252 252 252 252
Panel B: Value-weighted Portfolio Returns
Excess Return DGTW Adjusted Return Four-factor Alpha Five-factor Alpha
Mean 0.58% 0.40% 0.62% 0.53%
t-stat 2.72 2.42 3.37 2.91
Std.Dev. 3.37% 2.66%
Sharpe Ratio 0.59 0.53
Skewness -0.16 0.04
Kurtosis 1.16 1.87
No. of obs 252 252 252 252
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Table 12: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Monthly Returns on Hedge Fund Hold-
ings (HFH) and Residual Hedge Fund Holdings (RHFH)
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of monthly excess returns on
lagged hedge fund holdings (HFH) and residual hedge fund holdings (RHFH). Hedge fund holdings (HFH)
is the number of shares held by hedge funds over total shares outstanding at quarter end. Residual hedge
fund holdings (RHFH) is the residual from the cross-sectional regression of hedge fund holdings on turnover
at each quarter. Days-to-cover (DTC) is the short interest ratio (SR) over daily turnover. Size (LnME) is
the natural log of firm’s market capitalization at the end of June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is
the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Short-term
reversal (Rev) is the return from prior month. Momentum (MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns from
month t-12 to t-2. The sample runs from January 1992 to December 2012. All the t-statistics are Newey
and West (1987) adjusted to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * stands for
significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HFH 0.0134 0.0137
(1.47) (1.51)
RHFH 0.0236*** 0.0233***
(3.35) (3.27)
DTC -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(-6.43) (-6.44)
LnME -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0011
(-1.57) (-1.58) (-1.49) (-1.47)
LnBM 0.0037*** 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0036***
(3.03) (3.02) (3.00) (2.95)
Rev -0.0405*** -0.0402*** -0.0405*** -0.0403***
(-7.37) (-7.41) (-7.40) (-7.36)
Mom -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0007
(-0.16) (-0.13) (-0.20) (-0.21)
Constant 0.0179*** 0.0189*** 0.0183*** 0.0189***
(2.79) (2.94) (2.85) (2.90)
Ave.R-sq 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.035
N.of Obs. 996629 996629 992182 992182
61
Table 13: Predicting Daily Return Skewness in the Cross Section
This table reports results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of future 3-month daily return
skewness on Days-to-Cover (DTC), Short ratio (SR), Hedge fund holding (HFH), Residual hedge fund
holdings (RHFH) and other firm characteristics. Lskew3m is the lagged daily return skewness in the past
3 months. Turnover6m is the average daily turnover ratio in the past 6 months. Size (LnME) is the
natural log of firm’s market capitalization at the end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is
the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum
(MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. IO is the institutional ownership ratio.
IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility, calculated following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). All the
t-statistics are Newey and West (1987) adjusted to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ***,
**, and * stands for significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SR -0.2400** -0.4234***
(-2.59) (-4.07)
DTC 0.0007***
(3.68)
HFH 0.2743*** 1.4757***
(4.57) (3.08)
RHFH -1.1900**
(-2.49)
Lskew3m 0.0097*** 0.0096*** 0.0095*** 0.0095*** 0.0090***
(3.59) (3.54) (3.52) (3.51) (3.34)
Turnover6m -1.8541** -1.2820 -0.6649 -2.0248** -2.7322***
(-2.26) (-1.56) (-0.81) (-2.46) (-2.93)
LnME -0.0026 -0.0038 -0.0041 -0.0008 -0.0012
(-0.85) (-1.22) (-1.31) (-0.27) (-0.42)
LnBM 0.0260*** 0.0251*** 0.0251*** 0.0265*** 0.0256***
(7.46) (7.12) (6.96) (7.66) (7.14)
Mom -0.0702*** -0.0726*** -0.0727*** -0.0697*** -0.0680***
(-8.96) (-9.05) (-9.06) (-8.97) (-9.04)
IVOL 3.5692*** 3.5752*** 3.5752*** 3.5714*** 3.6691***
(7.68) (7.71) (7.72) (7.70) (7.95)
IO -0.1423*** -0.1284*** -0.1264*** -0.1611*** -0.1516***
(-6.82) (-5.67) (-5.51) (-7.64) (-6.70)
Constant 0.1624*** 0.1672*** 0.1655*** 0.1543*** 0.1393***
(7.84) (8.12) (8.07) (7.51) (6.01)
Ave.R-sq 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.024
N.of Obs. 988231 983910 983910 988231 988231
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